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AN IRRESISTIBLE ATTRACTION:
RETHINKING ROMANTIC JEALOUSY
AS A BASIS FOR SEX-DISCRIMINATION
CLAIMS
KRISTY DAHL ROGERS†
ABSTRACT
Recently, the Iowa Supreme Court concluded that an employer
who terminated an employee to allay the concerns of his jealous
spouse did not unlawfully discriminate on the basis of sex. Though
the Iowa decision addressed a claim filed under a state civil rights
statute, it highlights an emerging question in broader sexdiscrimination jurisprudence—whether terminating an employee
based on romantic jealousy constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.
This Note argues that Title VII should be interpreted to prohibit
some terminations based on romantic jealousy. Sex-discrimination
claims based on romantic jealousy are properly classified as mixedmotive claims. Thus, the question courts must ask in analyzing
romantic-jealousy claims is whether the jealousy that provoked a
termination was motivated by gender. In some circumstances, it will
be clear that gender motivated both romantic jealousy and any
termination resulting therefrom.
Courts should not rely on or extend precedents involving
favoritism or romantic relationships to dismiss sex-discrimination
claims arising due to romantic jealousy. The rationales justifying the
dismissal of claims in the favoritism and romantic-relationship
contexts are inapplicable to the romantic-jealousy context.
Furthermore, to dismiss claims due to the existence of nonsexual,
nonromantic personal relationships between employers and
employees would drastically limit Title VII’s reach. To accurately
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determine whether jealousy-based termination constitutes unlawful
discrimination, courts must look behind the jealousy.

INTRODUCTION
Melissa Nelson was just twenty years old when she graduated
from the dental-assistant program at Des Moines Area Community
1
College. A few months later, she accepted a position in the office of
her dentist, Dr. James Knight, in Fort Dodge, Iowa, just minutes from
2
the rural community where she attended high school. Melissa
continued to work for Dr. Knight for the next ten years, and she came
3
to regard him as both a father figure and a friend. When he abruptly
4
terminated her employment, she was shocked.
Dr. Knight forthrightly described his reasons for firing Melissa.
In fact, he terminated her in the presence of his pastor by reading to
her from a prepared statement that said his relationship with her had
5
become a detriment to his family. Dr. Knight wrote the statement
after his wife, who also worked at the office, demanded he fire
Melissa because she had come to view her as a threat to their
6
marriage.
7
That evening, Dr. Knight invited Melissa’s husband to his office.
He repeatedly assured Mr. Nelson that Melissa had not acted
8
inappropriately and that nothing was going on between them. But
Dr. Knight admitted that he thought about Melissa constantly and
9
feared he would try to have an affair with her if he did not fire her.
He acknowledged that he fired Melissa because he was concerned
that he had become too personally attached to her, and he admitted
10
that she was the best dental assistant he had ever had.

1. Joint Appendix at 62, 98, Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa
2013).
2. Id. at 32, 62, 98, 101, 131.
3. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 65 (Iowa 2013).
4. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 63.
5. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66. A copy of Dr. Knight’s handwritten statement appears in the
Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 38.
6. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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Melissa Nelson brought a sex-discrimination suit against Dr.
11
12
Knight in state district court under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, a
state civil rights statute modeled after Title VII of the Civil Rights
13
14
Act. Dr. Knight moved for summary judgment, arguing that Nelson
had cited no direct evidence of sex discrimination and asserting that
he had a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for terminating her—
15
his wife demanded that he fire her to preserve their marriage. The
district court granted summary judgment in favor of Dr. Knight,
reasoning that “Nelson was fired not because of her gender but
16
because she was a threat to the marriage of Dr. Knight.” On appeal,
17
the Iowa Supreme Court, in a controversial opinion, unanimously
18
affirmed summary judgment in favor of Dr. Knight. The opinion
framed the issue before the court as “whether an employee who has
not engaged in flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply
19
because the boss views the employee as an irresistible attraction.”
Because of this language, the media interpreted the opinion to
declare that an employee may be legally fired when her boss finds her
20
to be too attractive.

11. Id. at 65, 67.
12. IOWA CODE § 216.6 (2013).
13. Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Iowa 2009). Title VII is codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012).
14. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67.
15. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 14–21.
16. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67 (quotation marks omitted).
17. See, e.g., Ryan J. Foley, Iowa Court: Bosses Can Fire ‘Irresistible’ Workers,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Dec. 21, 2012, available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/iowa-court-bossescan-fire-irresistible-workers; Iowa: Court Upholds Firing of Woman Whose Boss Found Her
Attractive, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 22, 2012, at A17; CNN Newsroom (CNN television broadcast Dec.
21, 2012), available at http://www.cnn.com/2012/12/21/justice/iowa-irresistible-worker; Good
Morning America (ABC television broadcast Dec. 23, 2012), available at
http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/video/dental-assistant-fired-attractive-18049209.
18. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., No. 11–1857, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5 (Iowa
Dec. 21, 2012), withdrawn and superseded on reh’g, 834 N.W.2d 64 (Iowa 2013). Iowa has a
“deflective appellate structure” whereby district-court decisions are appealed directly to the
Iowa Supreme Court. State v. Effler, 769 N.W.2d 880, 883–84 (Iowa 2009); see IOWA CODE
§§ 602.4102, 602.5103 (2014) (defining the jurisdiction of the Iowa Supreme Court and the Iowa
Court of Appeals).
19. Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747, at *5.
20. See, e.g., Doug Barry, Iowa Supreme Court Says It Was Totally Cool for a Dentist To
Fire His ‘Irresistibly Attractive’ Female Employee, JEZEBEL, Dec. 22, 2012 (“In other words, a
female employee in Iowa was fired because her boss found himself leering at her too often, and
this incapacity to behave like a decent, professional human somehow, in the hothouse
imagination of the Iowa Supreme Court, became her problem.”); Rekha Basu, Iowa Supreme
Court Ruling in ‘Too Irresistible’ Case is an Embarrassment, DES MOINES REGISTER, Dec. 29,
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Six months later the Iowa Supreme Court took the unusual step
of withdrawing its original opinion and granting a rehearing without
21
oral argument. The superseding opinion unanimously reaffirmed
22
summary judgment in favor of Dr. Knight. The court’s analysis
23
remained largely unchanged, but it reframed the issue presented as
“whether an employee who has not engaged in flirtatious conduct
may be lawfully terminated simply because the boss’s spouse views
the relationship between the boss and the employee as a threat to her
24
marriage.” The superseding opinion also included a special
concurrence acknowledging that Nelson had stated a sexdiscrimination claim but ultimately concluding that she was fired
“because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with
25
her employer” and not because she was a woman. Once again the
26
decision received national media attention.
In deciding Nelson, the Iowa Supreme Court relied upon the
27
same analytical framework courts apply when interpreting Title VII.

2012 (“The ruling so disregards core civil rights principles that it is hard to believe this same
court made civil-rights history three years ago by ruling that gay people had a right to marry in
Iowa.”).
21. Order, Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747 (No. 11–1857); see Jeff Eckhoff, Iowa Supreme Court
Takes Another Look at ‘Irresistible Employee’ Case, DES MOINES REGISTER BLOG (June 26,
2013, 1:45 PM), http://blogs.desmoinesregister.com/dmr/index.php/2013/06/26/iowa-supremecourt-pulls-back-decision-on-irresistible-employee-lawsuit-for-another-look/article (noting that
a court spokesperson “called such situations ‘rare’ and said justices have granted a total of five
petitions to rehear a case over the past decade”); see also Ryan Koopmans, Iowa Supreme Court
To Reconsider Case of “Irresistible Employee”, ON BRIEF: IOWA’S APPELLATE BLOG (June 25,
2013),
http://www.iowaappeals.com/iowa-supreme-court-to-reconsider-case-of-irresistibleemployee (suggesting that the national response played a part in Nelson’s decision to file a
petition for rehearing).
22. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 2013).
23. The only significant change to the majority opinion beyond the sentence in which the
holding appeared was the addition of a paragraph contrasting the circumstances presented in
Nelson with those presented in an Eighth Circuit case reversing summary judgment in favor of
an employer based on the plaintiff’s allegation that she was fired because of her appearance.
Compare Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 71–72 (discussing Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591
F.3d 1033 (8th Cir. 2010)), with Nelson, 2012 WL 6652747, at *7 (omitting any discussion of
appearance-based sex-discrimination precedents).
24. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 69. Note that this framing of the issue shifts the focus to the
actions of Mrs. Knight.
25. Id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
26. See, e.g., Michael Kimmel, Fired for Being Beautiful, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2013, at A25;
20/20: The Naked Truth (ABC television broadcast Aug. 2, 2013).
27. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67 (Iowa 2013) (quoting Deboom v. Raining Rose, Inc., 772
N.W.2d 1, 7 (Iowa 2009); Channon v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 629 N.W.2d 835, 861 (Iowa
2001)). Recently, however, the Iowa Supreme Court clarified that federal antidiscrimination
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The court interpreted Title VII case law to provide “that an employer
does not engage in unlawful gender discrimination by discharging a
female employee who is involved in a consensual relationship that has
triggered personal jealousy,” regardless of whether the jealousy
28
would have existed had the employee been male. Virtually all states
29
have statutes banning sex discrimination in employment, and these
statutes are often interpreted in accordance with existing judicial
30
interpretations of Title VII or other state antidiscrimination statutes.
Judges and advocates will likely cite Nelson for the proposition that it
does not constitute sex discrimination for an employer to terminate
an employee based on jealousy experienced by the employer’s
partner or spouse. Thus, although Nelson addressed a state civil rights
claim, the case has broad implications with respect to an emerging
31
question in sex-discrimination jurisprudence—whether terminating
an employee based on romantic jealousy constitutes unlawful sex
discrimination.
This Note illustrates that Title VII should not be interpreted to
support a general rule that terminations based on romantic jealousy
are lawful. Part I briefly surveys the historical treatment of mixedmotive discrimination claims in the context of Title VII. Part II
describes how courts have dismissed sex-discrimination claims arising
in the romantic-jealousy context based on precedents concerning
favoritism and romantic relationships. Setting aside the question of
whether courts should rely on favoritism and romantic-relationship
precedents in deciding romantic-jealousy claims, Part III defines
jealousy and then relies on this definition to construct an affirmative
argument that terminations resulting from romantic jealousy may
constitute unlawful sex discrimination. Returning to the question set
aside in Part III, Part IV critiques both the application of favoritism
and romantic-relationship precedents to romantic-jealousy claims and

precedents are merely persuasive in interpreting the Iowa Civil Rights Act. Pippen v. State, 854
N.W.2d 1, 28 (Iowa 2014).
28. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67; see id. at 67–72 (surveying and describing Title VII case law).
29. Mitchell Poole, Paramours, Promotions, and Sexual Favoritism: Unfair, But Is There
Liability?, 25 PEPP. L. REV. 819, 828 (1998).
30. See, e.g., Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 67–72 (relying on federal appellate courts’
interpretations of Title VII and a Michigan appellate court’s interpretation of the Michigan
Civil Rights Act in interpreting the Iowa Civil Rights Act).
31. For example, a sex-discrimination claim involving romantic jealousy is currently
pending in New York. See Complaint, Dilek v. Nicolai, No. 160830/2013 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov. 20,
2013).
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Nelson’s extension of the romantic-relationship rule to personal
relationships.
I. A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF MIXED-MOTIVE ANALYSIS OF
TITLE VII CLAIMS
Sex-discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy are
properly classified as mixed-motive claims because they do not allege
32
that sex was the only reason for an employment decision. This Part
briefly describes how Title VII came to prohibit discrimination based
in part on sex and sketches the basic contours of the analytical
framework applicable to such claims.
33
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 made it unlawful for an
employer to discharge an employee “because of” his or her sex or
34
other protected characteristic. Over time, a circuit split emerged
concerning the proper interpretation of the phrase “because of.”
Some circuits stringently applied “but-for” analysis to Title VII
claims, recognizing discrimination only when the plaintiff showed that
an adverse employment decision would not have been made but for a
35
protected characteristic. For a female plaintiff to prevail on a sexdiscrimination claim in these circuits, she had to establish that an
adverse employment decision would not have been made if she had
36
been a man. By contrast, other circuits applied various forms of
mixed-motive analysis to Title VII claims, recognizing discrimination
when a plaintiff showed that a protected characteristic was a
“substantial,” “motivating,” or “discernible” factor in an adverse
37
employment decision. In 1989, the Supreme Court legitimized

32. See infra Part III.A.
33. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, Title VII, § 703, 78 Stat. 255 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2012)).
34. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012).
35. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 238 n.2 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(describing the approach taken in the Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits whereby the
plaintiff was required to show that but for the protected characteristic, the adverse employment
decision would not have been made), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No.
102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517
(2013).
36. Id.
37. See id. (describing the approaches taken in the First, Second, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits in which liability attached when a protected characteristic was a
“substantial,” “motivating,” or “discernible” factor in an adverse employment decision so long
as the employer did not prove that the same decision would have been made in the absence of
discrimination).
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mixed-motive analysis in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a case in
which a plurality and two concurring Justices concluded that Title VII
allows employers to be held liable for employment decisions
39
motivated only in part by an unlawful motive. This landmark
decision resolved the Title VII debate among the circuits and clarified
that Title VII prohibits employment decisions resulting from “both
40
legitimate and illegitimate considerations.” Under Price Waterhouse,
an employer could avoid liability for an employment decision
motivated in part by an employee’s protected characteristic only by
demonstrating that the same decision would have been made even if
41
the protected characteristic had not been considered.
Price Waterhouse retained two important limits on courts’
recognition of mixed-motive claims. First, recognition of mixedmotive claims was limited to cases in which a plaintiff demonstrated
that an illegitimate motive was a “substantial factor in the particular
42
employment decision.” Second, recognition of mixed-motive claims
was limited based on whether the plaintiff presented direct or
circumstantial evidence of discrimination. Mixed-motive claims that
relied on “direct evidence” to show that a protected characteristic was
a “substantial factor” in a contested employment decision were

38. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989) (plurality opinion), superseded by
statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as recognized in Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013).
39. Id. at 239–45 (plurality opinion); id. at 259–60 (White, J., concurring); id. at 265
(O’Connor, J., concurring); see Thomas F. Kondro, Comment, Mixed Motives and Motivating
Factors: Choosing a Realistic Summary Judgment Framework for § 2000e-2(m) of Title VII, 54
ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1439, 1442 & n.19 (2010) (observing that Price Waterhouse “legitimized the
mixed-motive analysis, which previously had been rejected by some circuits in favor of a more
stringent ‘but-for’ standard of causation”). Legislative history played a prominent role in the
outcome. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 239 & n.4, 241 & n.7, 243–44 & nn.8–9 (plurality
opinion); id. at 262 (O’Connor, J., concurring). Most notably, Congress rejected an amendment
that would have limited Title VII to prohibit only employment actions taken “solely because of”
a protected characteristic. 110 CONG. REC. 2728 (1964).
40. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 247 (plurality opinion); id. at 239–45; id. at 259–60
(White, J., concurring); id. at 265 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 252 (plurality opinion). Following Price Waterhouse, most courts interpreted
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence as controlling. Kristina N. Klein, Oasis or Mirage? Desert
Palace and Its Impact on the Summary Judgment Landscape, 33 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1177, 1184
& n.58 (2006); David Sherwyn & Michael Heise, The Gross Beast of Burden of Proof:
Experimental Evidence on How the Burden of Proof Influences Employment Discrimination
Case Outcomes, 42 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 901, 911 (2010); Kondro, supra note 39, at 1443. But see Gross
v. FBL Fin. Servs., Inc., 557 U.S. 167, 188 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing that Justice
White’s concurring opinion was “properly understood as controlling”).
42. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 278 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
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evaluated using the framework articulated in Price Waterhouse. By
contrast, mixed-motive claims that relied on “circumstantial
evidence” to show that an employment decision was motivated by a
protected characteristic continued to be analyzed under the pretext
44
framework applied to single-motive claims. To prevail under that
framework, an employee had to show either that the employer made
the employment decision for a discriminatory reason or that any
45
nondiscriminatory reason proffered by the employer was pretextual.
In practice, this meant that plaintiffs bringing mixed-motive claims
that relied on circumstantial evidence rarely prevailed because they
were unable to prove that employers’ articulated reasons for
46
employment decisions were pretextual. In other words, even after
Price Waterhouse, many mixed-motive claims failed because plaintiffs
47
were rarely able to present “direct evidence” that discriminatory
48
animus was a “substantial factor” in an employment decision.
Recognizing that Price Waterhouse would have the “inevitable
effect” of permitting prohibited employment discrimination to escape

43. Id. at 276–79.
44. Id. at 278–79. But see Kondro, supra note 39, at 1443 & n.26 (suggesting that in practice
the lower courts “categorically rejected” mixed-motive claims relying on circumstantial
evidence without applying the pretext framework).
45. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981) (citing McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804–05 (1973)).
46. See Michael A. Zubrensky, Despite the Smoke, There Is No Gun: Direct Evidence
Requirements in Mixed-Motives Employment Law After Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 46 STAN.
L. REV. 959, 976 (1994) (describing how plaintiffs with only circumstantial evidence to support a
mixed-motive claim “generally were unable to prove pretext because the defendant could
articulate a ‘legitimate, nondiscriminatory’ reason”). By design, the pretext framework was
intended to identify discrimination resulting from a single illegitimate motive. See Kondro,
supra note 39, at 1448.
47. “Direct evidence” was not explicitly defined in Price Waterhouse, but the definition
applied by Justice O’Connor strayed from the traditional definition. Paul J. Gudel, Beyond
Causation: The Interpretation of Action and the Mixed Motives Problem in Employment
Discrimination Law, 70 TEX. L. REV. 17, 68 (1991); Steven M. Tindall, Do as She Does, Not as
She Says: The Shortcomings of Justice O’Connor’s Direct Evidence Requirement in Price
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 17 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 332, 336, 343–44 (1996); Zubrensky,
supra note 46, at 969. This resulted in disparity among the lower courts in interpreting the
direct-evidence requirement. Id. at 970.
48. See Gabrielle R. Lamarche, State of Employment Discrimination Cases After Hicks, 32
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107, 111 & n.34 (1998) (observing that “direct evidence of discriminatory
intent by an employer rarely exists”); T.L. Nagy, The Fall of the False Dichotomy: The Effect of
Desert Palace v. Costa on Summary Judgment in Title VII Discrimination Cases, 46 S. TEX. L.
REV. 137, 141 (2004) (noting that mixed-motive plaintiffs “rarely presented direct evidence of a
discriminatory motive”).
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49

judicial sanction, Congress responded by passing the Civil Rights
50
51
Act of 1991 to amend Title VII. As amended, Title VII provides
that “an unlawful employment practice” is established once a plaintiff
demonstrates that a protected characteristic “was a motivating factor
for any employment practice, even though other factors also
52
motivated the practice.” Because the Civil Rights Act of 1991
abrogated Price Waterhouse, the Supreme Court subsequently held in
53
Desert Palace v. Costa that plaintiffs need not present direct or
substantial evidence to obtain a motivating-factor jury instruction,
effectively eliminating the Price Waterhouse limits on mixed-motive
54
analysis.
49. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 1, at 46 (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 584 (“The
inevitable effect of the Price Waterhouse decision is to permit prohibited employment
discrimination to escape sanction under Title VII.”); see H.R. REP. NO. 102-40, pt. 2, at 18
(1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 711 (“Price Waterhouse severely undermines
protections against intentional employment discrimination by allowing such discrimination to
escape sanction completely under Title VII.”).
50. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
51. See, e.g., Kondro, supra note 39, at 1444 (“Displeased by Price Waterhouse, Congress
passed the Civil Rights Act of 1991 to supersede the Supreme Court’s decision.”).
52. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012).
53. Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa, 539 U.S. 90 (2003).
54. Id. at 101–02; see id. at 98–100 (explaining that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 abrogated
Price Waterhouse). Importantly, Desert Palace addressed appropriate jury instructions for
mixed-motive claims rather than the appropriate framework for summary-judgment analysis.
Many federal courts of appeals responded by fully or partially eliminating the direct-evidence
requirement at the summary-judgment stage as well, but there remains a circuit split on the
appropriate summary-judgment framework for mixed-motive claims. Only the Eighth Circuit
has explicitly held that Desert Palace had “no impact” on summary-judgment analysis for
mixed-motive claims. Griffith v. City of Des Moines, 387 F.3d 733, 736 (8th Cir. 2004). Four
circuits permit plaintiffs pursuing mixed-motive claims to choose which framework is applied.
Perez v. N.J. Transit Corp., 341 F. App’x 757, 761 (3d Cir. 2009); Fogg v. Gonzales, 492 F.3d 447,
451 & n.* (D.C. Cir. 2007); Diamond v. Colonial Life & Accident Ins. Co., 416 F.3d 310, 318
(4th Cir. 2005); McGinest v. GTE Serv. Corp., 360 F.3d 1103, 1122 (9th Cir. 2004). The Sixth
Circuit no longer applies the pretext framework in summary-judgment analysis of mixed-motive
claims. White v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 533 F.3d 381, 400–01 (6th Cir. 2008). And the Fifth
Circuit allows plaintiffs with mixed-motive claims to avoid summary judgment by creating a
genuine issue with respect to whether the articulated reason for an employment decision was
pretextual or whether a protected characteristic was a motivating factor. Rachid v. Jack In The
Box, Inc., 376 F.3d 305, 312 (5th Cir. 2004). Three circuits have declined to decide this question.
See EEOC v. TBC Corp., No. 12–14341, 2013 WL 5433661, at *1 (11th Cir. Oct. 1, 2013) (noting
that the court “need not decide” the appropriate summary-judgment framework for mixedmotive claims following Desert Palace); Semsroth v. City of Wichita, 304 F. App’x 707, 718 &
n.11 (10th Cir. 2008) (noting that the court “need not resolve” whether Desert Palace required
any modifications to the pretext framework ordinarily applied at the summary-judgment stage);
Hillstrom v. Best W. TLC Hotel, 354 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2003) (expressing doubt as to whether
the question of the appropriate summary-judgment framework had been preserved but noting
that even if the issue had been preserved “it would make no difference” to the outcome in the
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Thus, Title VII currently provides that prohibited discrimination
occurs whenever sex is a motivating factor in an employment
decision, even if the same decision would have been made regardless
55
of the employee’s sex. When an employer proves that he would have
made the same decision absent the impermissible motivating factor,
however, the employee is not eligible to receive compensatory
56
damages.
II. JUDICIAL RELIANCE ON FAVORITISM AND ROMANTICRELATIONSHIP PRECEDENTS IN
ANALYSIS OF ROMANTIC-JEALOUSY CLAIMS
Few courts have considered sex-discrimination claims based on
57
terminations resulting from romantic jealousy. In the rare instances
in which courts have considered such claims, they have generally
refused to characterize the underlying employment decisions as sex
58
discrimination. This Part illustrates how precedents involving
case before the court). Nelson was an appeal from a decision granting summary judgment to the
employer, but the suit was brought under the Iowa Civil Rights Act, not Title VII. Thus, the
Iowa Supreme Court considered whether gender was a motivating factor in Nelson’s
termination without explicitly addressing the Eighth Circuit’s conclusion that Desert Palace
should not affect summary-judgment analysis of mixed-motive claims. Nelson v. James H.
Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 67 (Iowa 2013).
55. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) (2012); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (limiting damages in discrimination actions brought under
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) to declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and attorney’s fees when the
employer demonstrates that the same action would have been taken “in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor”).
57. This Note addresses sex-discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy,
distinguishing these from claims based on envy. See infra notes 141–51 and accompanying text
(describing the distinction between jealousy and envy and defining romantic jealousy).
Although courts do not tend to explicitly distinguish between claims involving jealousy and
envy, they consistently deny claims involving an employer who is envious of an employee’s
relationship with another person. See, e.g., Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 F. App’x
613, 615, 617 (6th Cir. 2012) (affirming summary judgment in favor of an employer described as
“jealous” when the employee showed that her supervisor was envious of her relationship with
another employee); Bush v. Raymond Corp., 954 F. Supp. 490, 491–92, 498 (N.D.N.Y. 1997)
(concluding that an employee’s allegation that she was terminated because her supervisor was
“jealous” of her relationship with another employee did not establish a prima facie case of sex
discrimination); Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 67, 74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that “conduct based on romantic jealousy” did not constitute sex discrimination when
an employee showed that his supervisor was envious of his relationship with another employee).
58. See Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 911 (8th Cir. 2006) (affirming
summary judgment in favor of the defendant); Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908
F.2d 902, 906 (11th Cir. 1990) (affirming judgment for the defendants); Nelson v. James H.
Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 73 (Iowa 2013) (affirming summary judgment in favor of the
defendants); cf. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 81 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“Research has
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favoritism and romantic relationships have played a role in this
refusal by describing two leading cases involving romantic jealousy,
59
Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc. and Tenge v. Phillips
60
Modern Ag Co. It then examines the Iowa Supreme Court’s reliance
on Platner and Tenge in concluding that Melissa Nelson’s termination
was lawful.
A. Judicial Reliance on Favoritism Precedents
Courts generally decline to recognize sex-discrimination claims
when preferential treatment of one employee due to nepotism or
favoritism resulted in another employee suffering an adverse
61
employment action. Courts apply this general rule even in cases in
which an adverse employment action resulted from sexual
62
favoritism, a form of favoritism that typically involves an employer
failed to uncover any appellate court in the nation that has recognized sex discrimination under
facts similar to those in this case.”). But see Lococo v. Barger, 234 F.3d 1268 (6th Cir. 2000)
(unpublished table decision) (reversing a district court’s grant of summary judgment to a
plaintiff who alleged that she was terminated based on the jealousy of her supervisor’s wife).
59. Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1990).
60. Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
61. See, e.g., Schobert v. Ill. Dep’t of Transp., 304 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2002) (“Whether
the employer grants employment perks to an employee because she is a protegé, an old friend, a
close relative or a love interest, that special treatment is permissible as long as it is not based on
an impermissible classification.”). But see Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 445 F. Supp. 421,
436 (W.D. Wash. 1977) (“Although Title VII does not prohibit nepotism as such, it prohibits
nepotism when it results in discrimination.” (citing Gibson v. Local 40, Supercargoes &
Checkers, 543 F.2d 1259, 1268 (9th Cir. 1976))), aff’d, 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984), modified,
742 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1984).
62. The position of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) is that
“isolated instances of preferential treatment based upon consensual romantic relationships” are
not prohibited by Title VII, whereas favoritism based on coerced conduct may constitute quid
pro quo harassment and widespread favoritism may constitute hostile-environment harassment.
U.S. EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY UNDER TITLE
VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/
sexualfavor.html. These guidelines are not mandatory. Stephen Dacus, Miller v. Department of
Corrections: The Application of Title VII to Consensual, Indirect Employer Conduct, 59 OKLA.
L. REV. 833, 842 (2006) (“EEOC regulations are not controlling authority.” (citing Meritor Sav.
Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986); Gen. Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 141 (1976);
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975))). Nonetheless, most circuits have
declined to recognize sex discrimination in the context of sexual favoritism. Duncan v. Cnty. of
Dakota, 687 F.3d 955, 959 (8th Cir. 2012); Wilson v. Delta State Univ., 143 F. App’x 611, 614
(5th Cir. 2005) (citing Ackel v. Nat’l Commc’ns, Inc., 339 F.3d 376, 382 (5th Cir. 2003));
Schobert, 304 F.3d at 733 (citing DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306 (2d
Cir. 1986)); Womack v. Runyon, 147 F.3d 1298, 1300–01 (11th Cir. 1998) (per curiam); Taken v.
Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th Cir. 1997); Becerra v. Dalton, 94 F.3d 145, 149–
50 (4th Cir. 1996); DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 308; Miller v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 679 F. Supp. 495,
501 (W.D. Pa. 1988), aff’d, 856 F.2d 184 (3d Cir. 1988). In addition, some states have declined to
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favoring an employee with whom he or she has a sexual or romantic
64
relationship. One rationale for refusing to recognize favoritism
claims is that when an employer favors one employee, every other
65
employee is equally disadvantaged regardless of his or her sex.
Consequently, favoritism does not necessarily suggest the existence of
66
an invidious motive toward either sex. Another rationale is that Title
VII prohibits differentiation based on “sex” but not differentiation
67
based on sexual, familial, or other relationships.
In the typical romantic-jealousy case, an employer becomes
aware that his or her spouse is jealous of a particular employee and
consequently terminates that employee. This bears some resemblance
to the typical sexual-favoritism case described above in that the
employer terminates the employee while considering the interests of
a person with whom he or she has a preexisting romantic
relationship—typically the employer’s spouse or romantic partner. It
is therefore unsurprising that courts have acknowledged that Title

recognize sexual-favoritism claims. Poole, supra note 29, at 845 (citing Herman v. W. Fin. Corp.,
869 P.2d 696, 701–03 (Kan. 1994); Erickson v. Marsh & McLennan Co., 569 A.2d 793, 801–03
(N.J. 1990)).
63. Some examples and hypothetical scenarios in this Note utilize gendered pronouns. For
clarity and consistency, the gender of employer and employee in these examples remains
consistent with the gender of the employer and employee in Nelson.
64. Dacus, supra note 62, at 833; Poole, supra note 29, at 819 n.2.
65. See, e.g., Green v. Adm’rs of Tulane Educ. Fund, 284 F.3d 642, 656 n.6 (5th Cir. 2002)
(“[F]avoritism, while unfair, disadvantages both sexes alike for reasons other than gender.”)
66. See, e.g., Preston v. Wis. Health Fund, 397 F.3d 539, 541 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Neither in
purpose nor in consequence can favoritism resulting from a personal relationship be equated to
sex discrimination.”).
67. See, e.g., Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 826 (4th Cir. 1989) (“The list of
impermissible considerations . . . is both limited and specific: ‘race, color, religion, sex or
national origin.’ We are not free to add our own considerations to the list.”); see also Taken, 125
F.3d at 1369–70 (“Title VII’s reference to ‘sex’ means a class delineated by gender, rather than
sexual affiliations.”); DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306–07 (“The proscribed differentiation under Title
VII . . . must be a distinction based on a person’s sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.”
(citing L.A. Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978); Meritor, 477
U.S. at 64)). Nonetheless, there is typically at least some causal connection between gender and
employment actions based on sexual favoritism because the favored employee’s gender
corresponds to the supervisor’s sexual preference for a particular gender. See Poole, supra note
29, at 832 (“Given that sexual favoritism is based first upon a supervisor’s attraction to a
particular gender, a causal connection exists between the supervisor’s subsequent actions,
gender, and who gets harmed.”).

ROGERS IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

RETHINKING ROMANTIC JEALOUSY

3/24/2015 11:44 AM

1465

VII does not prohibit employment decisions based on favoritism in
68
deciding romantic-jealousy claims.
But courts have dismissed romantic-jealousy claims based on
their similarity to favoritism claims rather than simply acknowledging
these similarities. For example, in Platner v. Cash & Thomas
Contractors, the Eleventh Circuit relied on the rule that Title VII
69
does not prohibit favoritism to dismiss a romantic-jealousy claim. In
Platner, the employer’s spouse was not jealous of the terminated
70
employee. Rather, his daughter-in-law suspected that the employee
71
and her husband (the employer’s son) were having an affair. The
employer terminated the employee because his daughter-in-law had
72
become “extremely jealous.” The record did not reflect whether the
73
alleged affair had actually occurred.
The court recognized that there was no basis for concluding that
the termination was based on the employee’s performance or
74
workplace conduct. The employee had socialized with her
coworkers, but the court concluded that although “not entirely
75
prudent,” such actions were “basically blameless.” The court
emphasized, however, that the trial judge had criticized the conduct
of the employer’s son and daughter-in-law by finding that he fueled
his wife’s jealousy and responded abusively to her accusations and
that she possessed “a heightened sense of need to protect her marital
76
interest.”
The Eleventh Circuit described the question presented as
whether, under such circumstances, “personal, family-related
reasons . . . constitute a legitimate, nondiscriminatory basis” for
77
terminating an employee under Title VII. The court characterized

68. See, e.g., Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 908–09 (8th Cir. 2006)
(describing the rule derived from sexual-favoritism precedents in considering a sexdiscrimination claim arising in the context of jealousy).
69. Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902 (11th Cir. 1990).
70. Id. at 903–04.
71. Id. at 903.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 903–04.
74. Id. But see Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 909 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing
Platner in a discussion about terminations involving consensual sexual conduct); Nelson v.
James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 76 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially)
(suggesting that the employee in Platner was fired due to sexually suggestive conduct).
75. Platner, 908 F.2d at 903 (quotation marks omitted).
76. Id.
77. Id. at 904.
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the employer as having faced “a choice as to which employee to
keep” and suggested that, in making that choice, the employer had
reasonably “opted to place the burden of resolving the situation” on
78
an unrelated employee rather than his son. Consequently, the court
concluded that the “ultimate basis” for the employer’s decision “was
79
not gender but simply favoritism for a close relative.” Having
determined that the termination was due to “personal, family-related
reasons,” the court held that termination was not actionable because
80
Title VII does not prohibit favoritism toward relatives.
B. Judicial Reliance on Romantic-Relationship Precedents
Courts consistently refuse to recognize sex-discrimination claims
when an employee has participated in a consensual sexual or
81
romantic relationship with an employer. The primary rationale for
this rule is that Title VII prohibits employment decisions “based on a
82
person’s sex, but not based on his or her sexual affiliations.” A
second rationale is that Title VII does not prohibit employment
decisions based on feelings unmotivated by any protected
83
characteristic. This rationale is distinguishable from the primary

78. Id. at 905.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 904, 905–06 (citing Holder v. City of Raleigh, 867 F.2d 823, 825–26 (4th Cir.
1989)).
81. See, e.g., Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th Cir. 2008) (“Essentially,
Benders complains of being discriminated against not because of her sex, but because of her
consensual sexual relationship with Mr. Bellows. We agree that these allegations are insufficient
to support a cause of action for sex discrimination.” (citing Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int’l, 86
F. Supp. 2d 377, 380 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Huebschen v. Dep’t of Health and Soc. Servs., 716 F.2d
1167, 1172 (7th Cir. 1983))); see also Taken v. Okla. Corp. Comm’n, 125 F.3d 1366, 1370 (10th
Cir. 1997) (declining to recognize sex-discrimination claims based on “consensual romantic
involvements”); DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 308 (2d Cir. 1986)
(holding that “voluntary, romantic relationships cannot form the basis of a sex discrimination
suit”); Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 75 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J.,
concurring specially) (“What has emerged from this complex area of the law is the general legal
principle that an adverse employment consequence experienced by an employee because of a
voluntary, romantic relationship does not form the basis of a sex-discrimination suit.” (citing
Kahn, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 382)).
82. DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306–07 (“The proscribed differentiation under Title VII . . . must
be a distinction based on a person’s sex, not on his or her sexual affiliations.”).
83. See, e.g., Barnett v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, 153 F.3d 338, 343 (6th Cir. 1998)
(“[P]ersonal conflict does not equate with discriminatory animus.”); McCollum v. Bolger, 794
F.2d 602, 610 (11th Cir. 1986) (“Personal animosity is not the equivalent of sex discrimination
and is not proscribed by Title VII.”); Keppler v. Hinsdale Twp. High Sch. Dist. 86, 715 F. Supp.
862, 869 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (applying a rebuttable presumption that termination following a failed
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rationale for the rule in that it presumes that employment decisions
made in the context of sexual or romantic relationships are motivated
by the employer’s feelings toward the employee rather than the
employee’s actions or sexual orientation. Finally, a third rationale is
that the employee who is romantically involved with an employer
elects to extend the workplace relationship into the private realm,
84
where the prohibitions of Title VII no longer apply. Courts do not
hesitate to apply the romantic-relationship rule to dismiss sexdiscrimination claims, including those based on jealousy arising in the
85
context of sexual relationships.
The rule that Title VII does not prohibit terminations in the
context of romantic relationships was extended to deny a claim based
on jealousy arising in the context of sexually suggestive employee
86
conduct in the Eighth Circuit case Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co.
The employer and employee in Tenge were not engaged in a sexual
relationship, but the employee acknowledged that she had engaged in
87
sexually suggestive conduct. For example, she and her employer had
pinched each other’s buttocks in the employer’s wife’s presence, and
she had left sexually suggestive notes for her employer in places
88
where others could see them. The employee acknowledged that this
suggestive behavior could have caused her employer’s wife to believe
that she had an intimate relationship with her employer, and the wife
did in fact suspect that such a relationship existed and was concerned
89
that the employee may have been attempting to seduce her husband.
The employer eventually terminated the employee, explaining to her

relationship is “the result not of sexual discrimination, but of responses to an individual because
of her former intimate place in her employer’s life”).
84. See Keppler, 715 F. Supp. at 869 (“An employee who chooses to become involved in an
intimate affair with her employer . . . removes an element of her employment relationship from
the workplace, and in the realm of private affairs people do have the right to react to rejection,
jealousy and other emotions which Title VII says have no place in the employment setting.”);
Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 76 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (pointing out “the practical change
in an employment relationship that occurs when a relationship extends beyond the workplace”).
85. See, e.g., Kahn, 86 F. Supp. 2d at 378–79, 382 (dismissing the claim of an employee who
was terminated at the insistence of her employer’s wife because the employee had a consensual
sexual relationship with the employer); Campbell v. Masten, 955 F. Supp. 526, 528, 529 (D. Md.
1997) (dismissing the claim of an employee who alleged that she was perceived to be a threat to
her employer’s marriage based on her prior sexual relationship with her employer).
86. Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903 (8th Cir. 2006).
87. Id. at 906.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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that his wife had made him choose between his “best employee or her
90
and the kids.”
The employee filed suit on the theory that “arousing the jealousy
of the boss’s wife is an illegal criterion for discharge under Title
91
VII.” The Eighth Circuit noted that the court was not presented with
a situation in which an employee had not engaged in sexually
suggestive behavior and was “terminated simply because an employer
92
or supervisor’s spouse perceive[d] the employee to be a threat.” On
the contrary, the question presented was whether “termination on the
basis of an employee’s admitted, consensual sexual conduct with a
93
supervisor” violates Title VII. The court was careful to point out
that the touching and the notes distinguished the employee’s actions
from the “general sexual banter” that took place among other
94
employees.
The Eighth Circuit closely examined the relationship between
sexual conduct and sexual favoritism, noting that sexual favoritism
occurs when one employee receives favorable treatment relative to
other employees based on a “consensual relationship” with the
95
employer. The court concluded that the relevant principle to be
taken from sexual-favoritism precedents is that when “an employee
engages in consensual sexual conduct with a supervisor and an
employment decision is based on this conduct, Title VII is not
implicated because any benefits of the relationship are due to the
96
sexual conduct, rather than the gender, of the employee.” Turning to
precedents in which employees were treated less favorably than
others based on consensual sexual conduct, the Eighth Circuit
described several courts as having concluded that “terminating an
employee based on the employee’s consensual sexual conduct does
97
not violate Title VII.” But the court based this observation primarily

90. Id.
91. Id. at 907.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 910.
95. Id. at 908–09.
96. Id. at 909.
97. Id. (emphasis added) (citing Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902,
903, 905 (11th Cir. 1990); Kahn v. Objective Solutions, Int’l, 86 F. Supp. 2d 377, 382 (S.D.N.Y.
2000); Campbell v. Masten, 955 F. Supp. 526, 529 (D. Md. 1997); Freeman v. Cont’l Technical
Serv., Inc., 710 F. Supp. 328, 331 (D. Ga. 1988)).
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98

on cases involving consensual sexual relationships that were properly
dismissed based on the traditional rule that Title VII does not
99
prohibit terminations resulting from romantic relationships.
The Eighth Circuit ultimately concluded that Title VII does not
prohibit terminations resulting from an “employee’s admitted
consensual sexual conduct with an employer” and held that the
100
termination did not constitute sex discrimination.
The court
emphasized the employer’s desire to calm his wife following the
employee’s admitted sexual conduct and found this to be the
101
“ultimate basis” for the termination.
The Eighth Circuit’s decision in Tenge extended the romanticrelationship rule to encompass not only terminations based on sexual
or romantic relationships, but also those based on sexually suggestive
102
employee conduct. But the Eighth Circuit declined to address
whether terminating an employee because she is perceived to
threaten a marriage would constitute unlawful discrimination if the
103
employee has not engaged in sexually suggestive conduct.
C. Judicial Reliance on Favoritism and Romantic-Relationship
Precedents in Nelson
When Nelson was decided, Platner and Tenge were the leading
cases involving sex-discrimination claims arising from romantic
jealousy. Predictably, the Iowa Supreme Court relied on Platner and
Tenge in dismissing Melissa Nelson’s claim, but the court
characterized both cases as dismissing sex-discrimination claims based
on favoritism precedents. Under the Nelson court’s analysis, the
“unstated reasoning” in Tenge was that “if a specific instance of
sexual favoritism does not constitute gender discrimination, treating
an employee unfavorably because of such a relationship does not
104
violate the law either.” Similarly, the court endorsed the view that
the employer in Platner had acted based on “favoritism for a close

98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 909.
See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
Tenge, 446 F.3d at 909–10.
Id. at 910.
Id.
Id. at 910 n.5.
Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 67–68 (Iowa 2013).
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relative” because he chose to burden an unrelated employee rather
105
than an employee who was also a relative.
The Nelson majority repeatedly emphasized that Dr. Knight’s
106
wife perceived Nelson to be a threat to her marriage. The court
recalled the circumstances that led to Mrs. Knight’s demand for
Nelson’s termination, including her discovery that Dr. Knight had
107
texted Nelson while vacationing with their children and her
perception that Nelson was flirtatious with Dr. Knight and cold
108
toward her. Mrs. Knight also believed that Nelson liked being alone
in the office with Dr. Knight after hours, and she thought it “strange
that after being at work all day and away from her kids and husband
[Nelson was not] anxious to get home like the other [women] in the
109
office.”
In describing the interactions between Nelson and Dr. Knight,
the court focused on conduct that could suggest that the two had
something other than an ordinary working relationship. The court
recounted that during the final six months of Nelson’s employment
she and Dr. Knight began texting each other about work matters and
110
innocuous personal matters. In particular, the court recalled that in
a moment of frustration with a coworker, Nelson once sent Dr.
Knight a text saying he was the “only reason” she continued to work
111
in the office. The court also focused on the suggestive nature of
112
texts sent by Dr. Knight. For example, Dr. Knight once sent Nelson

105. Id. at 69 & n.4 (quoting Platner v. Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 905
(11th Cir. 1990)).
106. Id. at 66, 67, 69, 71.
107. Id. at 66.
108. Id. Nelson denied flirting with Dr. Knight or desiring an intimate or sexual relationship
with him. Id. at 65.
109. Id. at 66 (second alteration in original); id. at 71 n.5. The court explicitly acknowledged
that “in isolation, this statement could be an example of a gender-based stereotype” but
apparently concluded that it did not constitute a stereotype because it “was linked to a specific
concern about Nelson’s relationship with [Dr. Knight].” See id.
110. Id. at 65–66. The court noted that both Dr. Knight and Nelson were parents and “some
of the texts involved updates on the kids’ activities and other relatively innocuous matters.” Id.
at 65.
111. Id. at 66; id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
112. Id. at 66 (majority opinion). The concurring justices described the texts as being “an
undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by Nelson and Dr. Knight” that
“revealed a relationship that was much different than would reasonably be expected to exist
between employers and employees in the workplace.” Id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring
specially).
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a text inquiring how frequently she orgasmed. Although the justices
acknowledged that Nelson did not reply, they emphasized that she
could “not remember ever telling Dr. Knight not to text her or telling
114
him that she was offended.” On another occasion, Dr. Knight sent
115
Nelson a text indicating that her shirt was too tight, and Nelson
116
replied that “she did not think he was being fair” because he did not
react the same way when other employees “really did wear tight,
117
revealing, and inappropriate clothing.” Dr. Knight responded that
“it was a good thing Nelson did not wear tight pants too because then
118
he would get it coming and going.” Nelson denied that her clothing
was inappropriate, but she testified that Dr. Knight occasionally
119
complained that her clothing was “distracting.” Dr. Knight admitted
that he once told her that if his pants were “bulging,” that meant her
120
clothing was “too revealing.” In a separate incident, Dr. Knight
mentioned an article he had read suggesting that frequent sex helps
prevent prostate cancer, and Nelson replied with a comment
121
suggesting that she had sex infrequently. Dr. Knight admitted that
he responded by telling her that was “like having a Lamborghini in
122
the garage and never driving it.”
123
Presumably due to the procedural posture of Nelson’s appeal,
the Iowa Supreme Court credited her assertion that she was not fired
due to her own conduct and described the issue before the court as
124
the one left open in Tenge. Specifically, the court framed the

113. Id.
114. Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
115. Id.; id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
116. Id. at 66 (majority opinion).
117. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 99.
118. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66; id. at 78 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
119. Id. at 65 n.3 (majority opinion). Nelson typically wore scrubs at the office, but she
sometimes removed her lab coat to reveal a fitted long-sleeve crewneck t-shirt or changed into
workout clothes before heading to the gym. Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 43, 62, 70, 99, 122–
23, 129, 133.
120. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.
121. See Joint Appendix, supra note 1, at 115, 127 (describing the context in which Nelson
made the statement about infrequency in her sex life).
122. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66.
123. Id. at 65 (“Because this case was decided on summary judgment, we set forth the facts
in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Melissa Nelson.”).
124. See id. at 68–69 (quoting Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 910 n.5 (8th
Cir. 2006)) (noting that Nelson claimed that she “did not do anything to get herself fired except
exist as a female” and argued that this distinguished her situation from that of the employee in
Tenge).
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question presented as “whether an employee who has not engaged in
flirtatious conduct may be lawfully terminated simply because the
boss’s spouse views the relationship between the boss and the
125
employee as a threat to her marriage.” In answering that question,
the court characterized federal case law derived from the context of
consensual sexual relationships as yielding the principle that an
“adverse employment action stemming from a consensual workplace
relationship . . . is not actionable under Title VII” because “an
isolated employment decision based on personal relations . . . is
driven entirely by individual feelings and emotions regarding a
specific person” and is not based on “factors that might be a proxy for
126
gender.” The court determined that the same principle applied to
Nelson’s claim because Nelson had a “personal relationship” with Dr.
127
128
Knight that was “consensual.”
The Iowa Supreme Court ultimately held that an employer who
terminates an employee because his wife is “concerned about the
nature of the relationship between the employer and employee” has
129
not committed unlawful sex discrimination. The court dismissed the
argument that an employer should not be able to avoid liability for
discrimination by terminating an employee “to avoid committing
sexual harassment,” reasoning that sexual harassment creates a hostile
atmosphere, whereas terminating an employee to avoid harassing her
130
“by definition does not bring about that atmosphere.” The court
also dismissed the argument that denying discrimination claims based
on jealousy in the absence of “employee misconduct” would allow
employers to avoid liability for discrimination simply by claiming to
have jealous spouses, reasoning that employees could still prevail by
131
showing that jealousy was a pretext for a decision based on gender.
Though the court acknowledged that an assessment that Nelson failed
to conform to a gender stereotype might have supported her claim, it

125. Id. at 69.
126. Id. at 70 (emphasis added) (citing Benders v. Bellows & Bellows, 515 F.3d 757, 768 (7th
Cir. 2008); Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 F. App’x 613, 617 (6th Cir. 2012); West v.
MCI Worldcom, Inc., 205 F. Supp. 2d 531, 544–45 (E.D. Va. 2002)).
127. See id. (citing Tenge, 446 F.3d at 905–06) (describing Nelson as being like Tenge in that
it involved “a personal relationship between the owner of a small business and a valued
employee of the business that was seen by the owner’s wife as a threat to their marriage.”)
128. Id. at 65, 70, 72.
129. Id. at 65 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 72 (citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 786–90 (1998)).
131. Id. at 70–71.

ROGERS IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

RETHINKING ROMANTIC JEALOUSY

3/24/2015 11:44 AM

1473

suggested that the existence of a “personal relationship” between her
and Dr. Knight eliminated any possibility that a gender stereotype
132
had motivated her termination.
Given that romantic jealousy by definition involves concern
133
about the nature of a relationship, Nelson strongly suggests that a
termination resulting from romantic jealousy can never support a sex134
discrimination claim. But the majority opinion was supplemented by
a special concurrence intended “to further explain the basis and
rationale for the decision” that reinforced the centrality of the
“personal relationship” between Nelson and Dr. Knight to the court’s
135
analysis. The concurrence clarified that “Nelson was terminated
because of the activities of her consensual personal relationship with
her employer, not because of her gender” and suggested that whether
a personal relationship existed was properly determined based on the
136
conduct of both parties. Looking to the conduct of Nelson and Dr.
Knight, the concurring justices explained that the record reflected
“enough activity and conduct to support a determination as a matter
of law that Nelson was terminated as a response to the consensual
137
personal relationship she maintained with Dr. Knight.” They
reasoned that although Dr. Knight’s sexual comments were
inappropriate for the workplace, “they nevertheless were an
undeniable part of the consensual personal relationship enjoyed by
138
Nelson and Dr. Knight.” Moreover, even if Nelson was terminated
because Dr. Knight was physically attracted to her, her termination

132. See id. at 71–72 (concluding that “the critical difference” between Nelson and a case in
which an employee was terminated for her failure to conform with gender stereotypes was that
“Nelson indisputably lost her job because Dr. Knight’s spouse objected to the parties’
relationship”). The court acknowledged that Mrs. Knight’s statement that she found it “strange
that after being at work all day and away from her kids and husband [Nelson was not] anxious
to get home like the other [women] in the office” might have been an example of a gender
stereotype. Id. at 71 n.5. It concluded, however, that the statement was not a stereotype because
it “was linked to a specific concern” by Mrs. Knight about the relationship between Nelson and
her husband. Id. at 66, 71 n.5.
133. See infra Part III.A.
134. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 65 (concluding that an employer may terminate an employee
because his spouse, “due to no fault of the employee, is concerned about the nature of the
relationship between the employer and the employee”).
135. Id. at 73 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially).
136. Id. at 78.
137. Id. at 79–80.
138. Id. at 78.

ROGERS IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

1474

3/24/2015 11:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1453

did not constitute sex discrimination because his attraction “surfaced
139
during and resulted from the personal relationship.”
III. ANALYZING ROMANTIC JEALOUSY AS A BASIS FOR SEXDISCRIMINATION CLAIMS
Setting aside the question of whether it is appropriate for courts
to rely on favoritism and romantic-relationship precedents to
foreclose romantic-jealousy claims, the question remains whether an
affirmative argument can be made that terminations resulting from
140
jealousy constitute unlawful sex discrimination. This Part attempts
to answer that question. It begins by defining romantic jealousy and
explaining why mixed-motive analysis is the appropriate framework
for determining whether a particular termination resulting from
romantic jealousy constitutes unlawful discrimination. It then
considers the form that analysis should take and concludes that
determining whether unlawful discrimination has occurred necessarily
depends on the circumstances giving rise to romantic jealousy.
A. Selecting the Appropriate Framework for Romantic-Jealousy
Claims
141

142

Philosophers and social scientists have long distinguished
143
144
between jealousy and envy, though courts and laypersons tend to

139. Id. at 79.
140. Note that like the opinions in Platner and Tenge, the Nelson opinion does not discuss
whether there may be an affirmative argument for recognizing romantic-jealousy claims in the
absence of precedents involving favoritism or relationships. All three opinions address the
question of whether gender actually motivated the defendant–employer to terminate the
plaintiff–employee in a conclusory manner. See Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903,
910 (8th Cir. 2006) (“The ultimate basis for Tenge’s dismissal was not her sex, it was Scott’s
desire to allay his wife’s concerns over Tenge’s admitted sexual behavior with him.”); Platner v.
Cash & Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.2d 902, 905 (11th Cir. 1990) (“It is thus clear that the
ultimate basis for Platner’s dismissal was not gender but simply favoritism for a close relative.”);
Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 71–72 (majority opinion) (describing Nelson’s termination as resulting
from the fact that Mrs. Knight, “unfairly or not, viewed her as a threat to her marriage” and
objected to her relationship with Dr. Knight).
141. W. Gerrod Parrott & Richard H. Smith, Distinguishing the Experiences of Envy and
Jealousy, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 906, 906 (1993) (“Philosophers from ancient
times to the present have argued that envy and jealousy have distinct causes and experiences.”
(citations omitted)); see generally Luke Purshouse, Jealousy in Relation to Envy, 60
ERKENNTNIS 179 (2004) (surveying philosophical models distinguishing between jealousy and
envy).
142. Parrott & Smith, supra note 141, at 906 (observing that many social psychologists and
other social scientists distinguish between jealousy and envy).
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145

use the terms interchangeably. Envy occurs when one experiences
146
feelings such as inferiority, resentment, or ill will because one lacks
147
and desires to possess something another person has. In contrast,
jealousy occurs when a person experiences emotions such as
apprehension, anxiety, and fear concerning the potential loss of
148
something already possessed to another person. In other words,
envy stems from the desire to get what someone else has, whereas
149
jealousy stems from the desire to keep what one already has.
Romantic jealousy is a particular form of jealousy in which what one
150
desires to retain is a romantic relationship. Thus, romantic jealousy
occurs when one person perceives another person to be a romantic
151
rival who threatens an existing romantic relationship.

143. See, e.g., Blackshear v. Interstate Brands Corp., 495 F. App’x 613, 615, 617 (6th Cir.
2012) (describing evidence suggesting that an employer was envious as supporting the
conclusion that the employer was jealous); Barrett v. Kirtland Cmty. Coll., 628 N.W.2d 63, 67,
74 (Mich. Ct. App. 2001) (referring to conduct resulting from envy as “conduct based on
romantic jealousy”). At least one legal commentator has also observed the distinction. Jane
Tucker, Note, Taming the Green-Eyed Monster: On the Need To Rethink Our Cultural
Conception of Jealousy, 25 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217, 224 (2013).
144. Peter Salovey & Judith Rodin, The Differentiation of Social-Comparison Jealousy and
Romantic Jealousy, 50 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1100, 1100 (1986). But see Parrott &
Smith, supra note 141, at 906 (observing that research suggests that laypersons implicitly
recognize the distinction between jealousy and envy).
145. Nonetheless, Homer Simpson accurately captured the distinction in an episode of the
The Simpsons: “Jealousy is when you worry someone will take what you have. Envy is wanting
what someone else has. What I feel is envy.” The Simpsons: Covercraft (FOX television
broadcast Nov. 23, 2014).
146. Parrott & Smith, supra note 141, at 906.
147. Salovey & Rodin, supra note 144, at 1100 (citing Philip M. Spielman, Envy and
Jealousy: An Attempt at Clarification, 40 PSYCHOANALYTIC Q. 59, 59–82 (1971)).
148. Parrott & Smith, supra note 141, at 906–07; Salovey & Rodin, supra note 144, at 1100,
1112.
149. Complicating this distinction is the fact that envy and jealousy may occur
simultaneously arising out of the same set of circumstances. See Parrott & Smith, supra note
141, at 907 (“When a person’s romantic partner gives attention to an attractive rival, that person
may both be jealous of the special relationship with the partner and also envious of the rival for
being so attractive.”).
150. Salovey & Rodin, supra note 144, at 1100.
151. Id. at 1112 (“When one’s relationship with another person is threatened by a rival . . .
one experiences romantic jealousy as one imagines the loss of that relationship . . . .”); see also
Stacie Y. Bauerle, James H. Amirkhan & Ralph B. Hupka, An Attribution Theory Analysis of
Romantic Jealousy, 26 MOTIVATION & EMOTION 297, 310 (2002) (“The function of romantic
jealousy may be viewed as a guardian of relationships. It is ignited by the jealous individual’s
perception that the romantic partner’s interest in the rival poses a threat to the primary
relationship.”).
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The above description reveals the chief difficulty with sexdiscrimination claims involving jealousy: jealousy is not necessarily
152
premised on biological sex or gender. Because sex and jealousy may
be disaggregated in this way, jealousy does not constitute an
inherently discriminatory basis for an employment decision. Recall
that under the framework applicable to single-motive claims, an
employee must demonstrate either that a protected characteristic was
the reason for an employment decision or that the employer’s
153
proffered nondiscriminatory reason for the decision was pretextual.
Once an employee demonstrates that jealousy would not have
occurred but for her gender, an employer can rely on garden-variety
jealousy as a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for an employment
154
decision because it is not inherently gendered.
One might be tempted to argue that the essential feature of
romantic jealousy—the perception of a threat to an existing romantic
relationship—supplies an adequate basis for recognizing that a
resulting employment decision is inherently discriminatory. This
argument recognizes that when a person believes her romantic
partner has an exclusive sexual preference, that belief probably
influences the likelihood that she will experience jealousy toward a
155
specific rival. It assumes that under such circumstances biological
sex or gender represents the dividing line between those she perceives
to be potential romantic rivals and those she does not. This
assumption translates to a claim that an employment decision based
on romantic jealousy is inherently discriminatory when the employer
is attracted exclusively to one biological sex or gender—a claim
premised on the assumption that when an employer has an exclusive

152. For example, consider the following scenario. An office manager works in an office
with her employer–husband, but she senses that he would prefer another employee with more
accounting experience to be the office manager. She knows that having two employees devoted
to office management is not feasible, given the size of the office. Fearing that she might lose the
position if she does not act, she asks her employer–husband to fire the other employee because
she is jealous. The employer–husband acquiesces and terminates the employee. This
termination resulted from jealousy, but it was completely unrelated to the terminated
employee’s gender. In fact, the gender of the terminated employee was not even specified in this
example.
153. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
155. Cf. Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 75 n.9 (Iowa 2013) (Cady,
C.J., concurring specially) (implying that sexuality plays a role in romantic jealousy by
emphasizing that the case was evaluated in the context of heterosexual relationships).
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sexual preference, romantic jealousy would not have occurred but for
the gender of the terminated employee.
The argument that an employment decision based on romantic
jealousy is inherently discriminatory is problematic and unpersuasive.
The difficulties arise primarily because the argument proceeds from
the premise that the employer has an exclusive sexual orientation.
From a normative perspective, undesirable consequences flow from
relying on the sexual orientation of the employer to provide the
causal link between sex and an employment decision. Such reliance
implies that some employees, namely those terminated by bisexual
employers, are entitled to less protection from employment156
discrimination laws than others. But practical difficulties would
likely result from linking recognition of romantic-jealousy claims to
the sexual orientation of employers. For example, parties might
debate which classification best fits a particular employer or what the
outcome should be if the spouse’s perception of an employer’s
sexuality does not perfectly align with his past sexual behavior.
From a doctrinal perspective, because the argument that
romantic jealousy is inherently discriminatory implies that sex and
romantic jealousy cannot be disaggregated, it suggests that the
appropriate framework for analysis of romantic-jealousy claims is the
157
pretext framework applicable to single-motive claims. Under this
framework, however, an employer could claim that his desire to
alleviate jealousy experienced by his romantic partner constituted a
legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for terminating an employee. To
prove that the employer’s articulated nondiscriminatory reason was
pretextual would require the employee to undermine the very basis
for her claim. Consequently, the argument that romantic jealousy is
inherently based on sex does not function effectively as an argument
in favor of recognizing that romantic jealousy may be a discriminatory
basis for an employment decision.
Further analysis illuminates why courts should be skeptical of the
argument that romantic jealousy is inherently premised on sex.
Assume for a moment that gender and sexual preference must align
in order to cause jealousy. Though such alignment may be necessary
to trigger romantic jealousy, it may not be sufficient to do so. For
example, a woman married to a heterosexual man may experience
156. Cf. id. (“Both Nelson and Dr. Knight are married to opposite-sex spouses, and this case
is evaluated in that context.”).
157. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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158

romantic jealousy toward only women, but she will not necessarily
experience romantic jealousy toward all other women. The existence
of romantic jealousy standing alone is fundamentally insufficient to
show that biological sex or gender actually motivated a particular
instance of romantic jealousy, even though biological sex or gender
may limit the circumstances under which jealousy may arise.
Consequently, the argument that romantic jealousy is inherently
based on sex is not only inadequate to support a sex-discrimination
claim under the pretext framework, but also inadequate to support a
sex-discrimination claim under the mixed-motive framework, which
requires an employee to demonstrate that sex was a motivating factor
159
in an employment decision.
More fundamentally, however, the foregoing illustration
demonstrates that sex and romantic jealousy can be disaggregated.
Because sex alone does not produce romantic jealousy, romantic
jealousy is not the product of a single motive. Rather, when romantic
jealousy occurs, more than one motive is at work. Thus, mixed-motive
analysis in sex-discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy is
appropriate. This raises the question of how an employee could
demonstrate that sex actually motivated an employment decision that
resulted from romantic jealousy.
B. Applying Mixed-Motive Analysis to Romantic-Jealousy Claims
As the preceding analysis demonstrates, it would be
inappropriate to assume that an employer was motivated by sex
merely because he admitted to terminating an employee once his
spouse experienced jealousy. Because jealousy is not inherently
160
gendered, determining whether gender was a motivating factor in a
termination requires an examination of the circumstances giving rise
to jealousy. Do those circumstances suggest that an impermissible
motive was at work when the jealousy arose?
The seminal case, Price Waterhouse, illustrates the importance of
examining the circumstances that resulted in a termination when

158. As previously noted, the gender of the parties in the hypothetical scenarios presented
in this Note corresponds to the gender of the employer and employee in Nelson. See supra note
63. This is not intended to suggest that women are more likely than men to experience romantic
jealousy. For a recent summary of studies concerning sex differences in the experience of
romantic jealousy, see Tucker, supra note 143, at 233.
159. See supra notes 52–56 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 148, 152.
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161

assessing mixed-motive sex-discrimination claims. Attorney Ann
Hopkins had received consistent praise from partners and clients
alike for her competence and performance, but she was denied
partnership because of “perceived shortcomings” relating to her
162
“abrasiveness.” In analyzing Hopkins’ sex-discrimination claim, the
Supreme Court recounted the “clear signs” that some partners’
negative reactions to Hopkins were influenced by the fact that she
was a woman:
One partner described her as “macho”; another suggested that she
“overcompensated for being a woman”; a third advised her to take
“a course at charm school[.”] Several partners criticized her use of
profanity; in response, one partner suggested that those partners
objected to her swearing only “because it’s a lady using foul
language.” Another supporter explained that Hopkins “ha[d]
matured from a tough-talking somewhat masculine hard-nosed
[manager] to an authoritative, formidable, but much more appealing
lady [partner] candidate.” But it was the man who . . . bore
responsibility for explaining to Hopkins the reasons for the . . .
decision to place her candidacy on hold who delivered the coup de
grace: in order to improve her chances for partnership, Thomas
Beyer advised, Hopkins should “walk more femininely, talk more
femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair
163
styled, and wear jewelry.”

In describing the proper approach to assessing whether gender
impermissibly motivated an employment decision, the Court
indicated that judges must consider whether, if asked “at the moment
of the decision what its reasons were” for making an employment
decision, a truthful employer would admit that “one of those reasons
164
[was] that the . . . employee was a woman.” It went on to explain
that “an employer who acts on the basis of a belief that a woman
cannot be aggressive, or that she must not be, has acted on the basis
165
of gender.”
As the Court’s analysis illustrates, mixed-motive
analysis does not ask merely whether an employer’s stated reason for
an employment decision inherently implicates biological sex or
161. Recall that Price Waterhouse was the case that legitimized mixed-motive analysis and
led to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991. See supra notes 38–51.
162. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 231–32, 234–35 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. at 235 (citations omitted).
164. Id. at 250–51.
165. Id.

ROGERS IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

1480

3/24/2015 11:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1453

gender. Rather, mixed-motive analysis looks behind the stated reason
to ask whether the employer actually weighed assessments of the
employee motivated by biological sex or gender in reaching an
employment decision.
Romantic jealousy involves an assessment that a person
166
constitutes a threat to an existing relationship. When an employer
acknowledges that he terminated a particular employee due to
romantic jealousy, he also acknowledges that in making the decision
to terminate the employee he considered an assessment that the
employee represented a threat to his existing relationship. Thus, in
analyzing romantic-jealousy claims brought under the mixed-motive
framework, the operative question is whether the circumstances
suggest that, more likely than not, biological sex or gender motivated
an assessment that a particular employee threatened the relationship
between the employer and his spouse.
Answering this question in any particular case requires an
examination of the facts and circumstances giving rise to romantic
jealousy. Yet it is also possible to identify paradigmatic situations
suggesting that gender impermissibly motivated how an employee
came to be perceived as a threat to an employer’s existing romantic
relationship. This is not to say that an individualized factual
assessment is not required in every case. Rather, the point is that
when the facts demonstrate that one of these situations is present,
they also suggest that gender motivated the assessment that the
employee represented a threat and thus constituted an impermissible
motivating factor in any employment decision resulting therefrom.
The following subsections describe three paradigmatic situations in
which one might reasonably conclude that gender motivated an
assessment that an employee represented a threat to an employer’s
existing relationship.
1. Sexual Attraction and Sexual Attractiveness. One can imagine
how romantic jealousy could arise as a consequence of assessments
concerning the sexual attractiveness of an employee. An employer
could express that he finds a particular employee to be sexually
attractive. Or his romantic partner might believe he is attracted to a
particular employee based on her own assessment of the employee’s
attractiveness or her beliefs concerning the likelihood that he would

166. See supra notes 148–51 and accompanying text.
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find the employee to be attractive. In either case, the employee is
assessed in terms of sexual attractiveness.
167
Outside the romantic-jealousy context, legal scholars and
168
courts have recognized that employment decisions motivated by
assessments concerning the physical attractiveness of employees may
constitute actionable discrimination. One theory for recognizing that
assessments of sexual attractiveness bring employment decisions
within the purview of Title VII frames such assessments as the
169
product of impermissible sex stereotypes. Other theories supply
170
alternative bases for arriving at the same result. Whatever the
underlying theory, the critical point for the analysis at hand is that an
assessment concerning the attractiveness of an employee may reflect
that gender played an impermissible motivating role in an
employment decision.
2. Conformity with Sex Stereotypes. It is easy to see how
assessments of employees based on sex stereotypes could contribute
to romantic jealousy. For example, romantic jealousy may result from
167. See, e.g., Enbar Toledano, The Looking-Glass Ceiling: Appearance-Based
Discrimination in the Workplace, 19 CARDOZO J.L. & GENDER 683, 700 (2013) (“[A]ppearancebased employment decisions may bring an employer’s actions under the purview of a relevant
statute if they are sufficiently related to an individual’s federally protected status.”).
168. See, e.g., Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C., 591 F.3d 1033, 1041–42, 1043 (8th Cir.
2010) (reversing summary judgment in favor of an employer because the employee produced
evidence that the employer required women filling a particular position to be “pretty” and
criticized an employee’s appearance); Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 77
(Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“[A]n employer cannot legally fire an employee
simply because the employer finds the employee too attractive or not attractive enough.” (citing
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion); Lewis, 591 F.3d at
1037)).
169. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 77 (“It is abundantly clear that a woman does not lose the
protection of our laws prohibiting sex discrimination just because her employer becomes
sexually attracted to her, and the employer’s attraction then becomes the reason for terminating
the woman once it, in some way, becomes a problem for the employer. If a woman is terminated
based on stereotypes related to the characteristics of her gender, including attributes of
attractiveness, the termination would amount to sex discrimination because the reason for
termination would be motivated by the particular gender attribute at issue.”).
170. For example, one legal scholar has noted that early precedents recognizing a cause of
action for sexual harassment under Title VII “relied on a sexual-desire-based notion of
causation” in which “the causal mechanism bringing harassment within the prohibition of Title
VII is the heterosexual feelings of attraction, lust, or desire that motivate the male harasser to
act upon a female employee.” David S. Schwartz, When Is Sex Because of Sex? The Causation
Problem in Sexual Harassment Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1697, 1719–20 (2002). Under this
theory, “Discrimination in the sense of exercising a preference . . . for women rather than men
as sex objects . . . becomes sex discrimination in the invidious sense because the targeted woman
is disadvantaged relative to her male co-workers.” Id. at 1720.
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an employer working closely with a woman perceived to conform to
171
or the “sexuallythe stereotype of the “brazen temptress”
172
accommodating secretary.” Conversely, romantic jealousy may stem
from an employer working closely with a woman who fails to conform
173
to stereotypes depicting women as caregivers or “pure, delicate and
174
vulnerable creature[s].” In some circumstances, another protected
characteristic of an employee, such as her race or her age, may
contribute to the decision to assess her according to a particular
stereotype.
Importantly, adverse employment actions resulting from
consideration of sex stereotypes fall within the scope of Title VII’s
175
protections. The critical question appears to be one of causation
with respect to the employment decision. In other words, did
assessment of the employee according to a sex stereotype lead to an
171. See, e.g., John D. Johnston, Jr. & Charles L. Knapp, Sex Discrimination by Law: A
Study in Judicial Perspective, 46 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 704–05 (1971) (describing the stereotype of
a woman “as a brazen temptress, from whose seductive blandishments the innocent male must
be protected”); Ann C. McGinley, Masculinities at Work, 83 OR. L. REV. 359, 395–96 (2004)
(observing that Title VII prohibits the use of stereotypes such as “woman as dangerous
temptress” or “woman as siren” in making employment decisions).
172. See Heelan v. Johns-Manville Corp., 451 F. Supp. 1382, 1390 (D. Colo. 1978) (noting
the prevalence of the “stereotype of the sexually-accommodating secretary” in popular culture).
173. See Dédé Koffie-Lart & Christopher J. Tyson, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,
6 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 615, 620 (2005) (observing that “[t]he recurring stereotype of woman as
caregiver has generated numerous lawsuits”); McGinley, supra note 171, at 389, 393–94
(observing that “women who do not comport to the female stereotype as caregiver are
punished”).
174. See Johnston & Knapp, supra note 171, at 704–05 (observing that “the female is viewed
as a pure, delicate and vulnerable creature who must be protected from exposure to immoral
influences”).
175. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (plurality opinion)
(“As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an employer could
evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched the stereotype associated with
their group, for ‘[i]n forbidding employers to discriminate against individuals because of their
sex, Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes.’” (quoting L.A. Dep’t. of Water & Power v. Manhart,
435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978))); Terveer v. Billington, 34 F. Supp. 3d 100, 116 (D.D.C. 2014)
(“Under Title VII, allegations that an employer is discriminating against an employee based on
the employee’s non-conformity with sex stereotypes are sufficient to establish a viable sex
discrimination claim.” (citing Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251)); Nelson v. James H. Knight
DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 77 (Iowa 2013) (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“If a woman is
terminated based on stereotypes related to the characteristics of her gender, . . . the termination
would amount to sex discrimination.” (citing Smith v. City of Salem, 378 F.3d 566, 574 (6th Cir.
2004))); Clare Diefenbach, Same-Sex Sexual Harassment After Oncale: Meeting the “Because of .
. . Sex” Requirement, 22 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 42, 80 (2007) (“[C]ourts have found
that harassment based on a person’s failure to comport with gender stereotypes is actionable.”
(emphasis omitted)).
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adverse employment decision? In Price Waterhouse, the Supreme
Court recognized that sex stereotypes may impermissibly motivate an
employer’s evaluation of an employee’s performance-related
personality characteristics and implied that employment decisions
motivated by sex stereotypes in other ways may be equally
176
Thus, in the ensuing years, “sex-stereotyping
discriminatory.
jurisprudence has developed to protect many people who are
discriminated against because of their failure to conform to a wide
array of stereotypes about appropriate behavior and appearance for a
177
particular sex.”
3. Sexually Suggestive Conduct. Knowledge that an employer has
engaged in sexually suggestive conduct toward an employee could
also contribute to romantic jealousy. When an employer engages in
sexually suggestive conduct toward a particular employee, his
romantic partner might understandably perceive the employee to
threaten her relationship with the employer. Depending on the nature
of the employer’s conduct, it might be obvious that the employee’s
gender played a motivating role in the employer’s decision to engage
in sexually suggestive conduct toward her. That such conduct may be
impermissibly motivated by gender is reflected in the fact that
employers face potential liability for sexually harassing conduct
178
toward employees even in the absence of jealousy.
Conversely, sexually suggestive conduct by an employee directed
toward an employer does not suggest that any resulting termination
was motivated by the employee’s gender. The employee who engaged
in sexually suggestive conduct in the workplace, rather than her
employer, is the actor whose conduct might have been motivated by
176. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 251 (explaining that sex stereotypes are problematic
because “Congress intended to strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and
women resulting from sex stereotypes” (emphasis added) (quoting L.A. Dep’t. of Water &
Power, 435 U.S. at 707 n.13) (quotation marks omitted)); id. at 243–44 (pointing to evidence
that Congress recognized that “[t]o discriminate is to make a distinction, to make a difference in
treatment or favor, and those distinctions or differences in treatment or favor which are
prohibited . . . are those which are based on any . . . forbidden criteria” (quoting 110 CONG.
REC. 7213 (1964)) (quotation marks omitted)).
177. Sunish Gulati, Note, The Use of Gender-Loaded Identities in Sex-Stereotyping
Jurisprudence, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 2177, 2177 (2003); see Lewis v. Heartland Inns of Am., L.L.C.,
591 F.3d 1033, 1038, 1042 (8th Cir. 2010) (reversing summary judgment for an employer in a
case in which the employee alleged “that her employer found her unsuited for her job not
because of her qualifications or her performance on the job, but because her appearance did not
comport with its preferred feminine stereotype”).
178. See infra note 221 and accompanying text.
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gender. Put another way, the gender motivations at play in this
scenario flow away from, rather than toward, the employee. A court
might deny a romantic-jealousy claim in such circumstances because
the jealousy that led to the employee’s termination was motivated not
by her gender, but by the gender of her employer. Alternatively, a
court might conclude that the employee’s actions caused the jealousy
179
that resulted in her termination.
C. The Results of Applying Mixed-Motive Analysis to RomanticJealousy Claims
Given that biological sex or gender need only be a motivating
180
factor in an adverse employment decision to violate Title VII, the
preceding analysis clarifies that the strength of the theoretical basis
for recognizing a termination based on romantic jealousy as unlawful
discrimination turns on the underlying circumstances of the particular
case. It also demonstrates that when an employee is terminated
because of romantic jealousy, the presence of certain paradigmatic
situations may strongly suggest that the jealousy was motivated by
gender. To the extent that these situations commonly motivate
jealousy, the foregoing analysis suggests that many employment
decisions resulting from romantic jealousy violate Title VII. But
critically, the outcome of a romantic-jealousy claim never turns
merely on the employee’s ability to show that jealousy existed.
Rather, it turns on the employee’s ability to point to specific facts
suggesting that the employer considered an assessment of the
employee motivated by gender in making an employment decision.
Note the common thread that runs between the paradigmatic
situations described above. Namely, each represents a situation
involving conduct that could independently support liability under
Title VII in the absence of jealousy. When the circumstances giving
rise to jealousy could not lawfully serve as the basis for an
employment decision, it makes sense to recognize that unlawful
discrimination has occurred. An employer cannot lawfully terminate
181
an employee based on feelings of attraction toward her or based on
182
the degree to which she conforms with gender stereotypes.
Similarly, an employer who engages in sexually suggestive conduct
179.
180.
181.
182.

See supra notes 96–97, 100–01 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I and notes 164–65 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 175, 177 and accompanying text.
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toward an employee may be liable for sexual harassment. When the
sort of conduct that could support Title VII liability gives rise to
jealousy and an employee is terminated as a result, the fact that such
conduct occurred constitutes evidence that gender probably
184
motivated that jealousy and any resulting termination.
Importantly, the theoretical basis for recognizing that sex
discrimination has occurred is not diminished simply because the
employer himself was not the individual who became jealous. By
making an employment decision based on the jealousy of his romantic
partner, an employer effectively adopts that jealousy and its
underlying motivations as the basis for his decision. Furthermore, the
jealous person may be an employee in addition to being the
185
employer’s romantic partner. An employment relationship between
an employer and his romantic partner may serve as an additional
basis for imputing the partner’s discriminatory motives to the
employer. The Supreme Court recently held that the discriminatory
186
motives of supervisors may be imputed to employers. Thus, an
employer may be liable for the discriminatory motives of an
employee–spouse who stands in the relationship of supervisor to a
terminated employee. The Court explicitly left open the question of
whether the discriminatory motives of nonsupervisory coworkers that
influence the ultimate decision to terminate an employee may also be
187
imputed to employers. However, the argument that an employer
should be liable when sex motivates an employee–spouse is stronger
than the argument that an employer should be liable when sex
motivates a nonspouse employee. This is particularly true when an

183. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (describing sexual
harassment prohibited by Title VII).
184. See Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 251 (1989) (observing that “sex
stereotypes do not inevitably prove that gender played a part in a particular employment
decision” but “can certainly be evidence that gender played a part”).
185. For example, the person experiencing jealousy was an employee in Nelson, Platner, and
Tenge. Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903, 903 (8th Cir. 2006); Platner v. Cash &
Thomas Contractors, Inc., 908 F.3d 902, 903 (11th Cir. 1990); Nelson v. James H. Knight DDS,
P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 2013).
186. Staub v. Proctor Hosp., 131 S. Ct. 1186, 1192–93 (2011) (“Since a supervisor is an agent
of the employer, when he causes an adverse employment action the employer causes it; and
when discrimination is a motivating factor in his doing so, it is a ‘motivating factor in the
employer’s action,’ precisely as the text requires.”). Though Staub addressed the question of
employer liability for the discriminatory motives of supervisors in the context of the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (USERRA), the Court explicitly
acknowledged that USERRA is “is very similar to Title VII.” Id. at 1191.
187. Id. at 1194 n.4.
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employer explicitly adopts the jealousy experienced by an employee–
spouse as the reason for terminating another employee.
Nonetheless, an employer found liable for sex discrimination
under mixed-motive analysis may be able to limit damages. For
example, assume that an employee has pointed to facts demonstrating
that gender motivated the romantic jealousy her employer cited as
the reason for her termination. Under the mixed-motive framework,
she is entitled to prevail on the question of liability, but she will not
receive compensatory damages if her employer can demonstrate that
he would have made the same decision had he not been
188
impermissibly motivated by gender. This raises the question of
whether the employer could argue that jealousy is not inherently
gendered and point to the jealousy experienced by his spouse to
prove his same-decision defense. Under Title VII, however, an
employer may limit damages only if he demonstrates that he “would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible
189
motivating factor.” Thus, when an employee shows that gender
played a motivating role in bringing about the jealousy that caused
her termination, the employer loses his ability to point to that
jealousy as a legitimate reason for deciding to terminate her. In other
words, the employer could limit damages only if he could point to a
legitimate reason for terminating the employee that was independent
of the jealousy experienced by his spouse.
As the foregoing analysis demonstrates, a mere accusation that
jealousy was the reason for an employment decision is an insufficient
basis to conclude that gender motivated that decision. From an
employer’s admission that romantic jealousy was the sole reason for
his decision to terminate an employee, it does not necessarily follow
that his decision was motivated by gender. But the fact that romantic
jealousy is not always gender-motivated does not mean that it never
is. Thus, mixed-motive analysis of romantic-jealousy claims calls for
careful assessment of the circumstances to determine whether gender
actually motivated the jealousy that led an employer to terminate his
employee. Only by engaging in this analysis can courts properly

188. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)(2)(B) (2012). As envisioned by the Supreme Court in Price
Waterhouse before the Civil Rights Act of 1991, see supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text,
the same-decision defense required an employer to “show that its legitimate reason, standing
alone, would have induced it to make the same decision.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 252 (1989) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
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distinguish between claims that are entitled to relief and claims that
are not.
IV. RECONSIDERING THE APPLICATION OF FAVORITISM AND
ROMANTIC-RELATIONSHIP PRECEDENTS TO ROMANTIC-JEALOUSY
CLAIMS
Assuming that gender motivates some jealousy-based
terminations, the question then becomes whether courts should apply
favoritism and romantic-relationship precedents to dismiss romanticjealousy claims. This Part argues that the rationales supporting the
dismissal of sex-discrimination claims arising in the context of
favoritism and romantic relationships do not justify the dismissal of
sex-discrimination claims arising in the context of romantic jealousy.
In addition, this Part illustrates why Nelson’s extension of the rule
prohibiting sex-discrimination claims arising in the context of
romantic relationships to prohibit claims arising in the context of
nonromantic personal relationships is deeply problematic.
A. Reconsidering the Limits of Favoritism Precedents
Employment decisions based on favoritism and employment
decisions based on romantic jealousy unquestionably share some
similarities. In both circumstances, employment decisions are not
based on an employee possessing or lacking work-related skills or
190
qualifications. Furthermore, in both circumstances, employment
decisions are intended to benefit an individual with whom an
employer has a relationship. Given these similarities, courts have
predictably applied favoritism precedents in deciding sex191
discrimination claims based on romantic jealousy. But employment
decisions based on favoritism differ from those based on romantic
jealousy in significant respects, suggesting that this practice lacks a
stable doctrinal foundation. This Subsection demonstrates that these
underlying differences are sufficiently important to counsel against
reliance on favoritism precedents in analyzing romantic-jealousy
claims.
Employment decisions based on favoritism and those based on
romantic jealousy differ in purpose. Decisions based on favoritism

190. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 683 (9th ed. 2009) (defining favoritism as being “based
on factors other than merit”).
191. See supra Part II.A.
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typically occur when an employer seeks to confer an employment
benefit on another person based on his relationship with that
192
In another conceivable variant of favoritism, the
individual.
employer refrains from imposing an adverse employment
consequence on the favored employee. Whatever action the employer
takes, his primary goal is to engage in favorable treatment toward the
favored employee, whether directly (by granting a benefit) or
indirectly (by preventing a harm). The resulting harm to other
employees is a secondary consequence of achieving this primary goal.
The employer is not unlawfully motivated to single out a particular
employee for unfavorable treatment on the basis of a protected
characteristic.
In contrast, decisions based on romantic jealousy involve an
employer imposing an adverse employment action on a particular
employee because she has become the object of jealousy. Although
the employer’s primary purpose might be to alleviate his romantic
partner’s jealousy, the employer terminates a particular employee to
accomplish that purpose. And as the preceding analysis has shown, an
unlawful motivation may underlie the jealousy the employer seeks to
193
alleviate.
That gender may have a causal connection to employment
decisions based on romantic jealousy further distinguishes those
decisions from employment decisions based on favoritism. Gender
has no causal connection to employment decisions made to favor a
194
family member or a friend. And although sex may motivate
employment decisions favoring a paramour, the causal connection
flows from the employer to the favored employee rather than from
195
the employer to the disfavored employee. But when an employment
decision is based on romantic jealousy motivated by gender, the sex

192. See supra Part II.A.
193. See supra Part III.B.
194. See Mary Anne Case, A Few Words in Favor of Cultivating an Incest Taboo in the
Workplace, 33 VT. L. REV. 551, 555 (2009) (reasoning that nepotism is not sex discrimination
because “no one of any sex, other than this particular person, could have gotten the job”);
Poole, supra note 29, at 858 (noting that “[k]inship is largely an accident of birth”).
195. Poole, supra note 29, at 849 (“In sexual favoritism cases, it is the paramour’s gender,
not the victim’s, that partially motivates the employer or supervisor.” (citing Michael J. Phillips,
The Dubious Title VII Cause of Action for Sexual Favoritism, 51 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 547, 570
(1994))).
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of the harmed employee is causally connected to the employer’s
196
decision.
As this analysis demonstrates, employment decisions based on
favoritism fundamentally differ from those based on romantic
jealousy. Critically, these differences illuminate why the primary
rationale for the rule that employment decisions based on favoritism
do not constitute sex discrimination does not apply to decisions based
on romantic jealousy. As the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC) has recognized, “favoritism toward a
‘paramour’ (or a spouse, or a friend) may be unfair, but it does not
discriminate against women or men in violation of Title VII, since
197
both are disadvantaged for reasons other than their genders.” In
contrast, an isolated instance of romantic jealousy does not
disadvantage both genders equally. Rather, the resulting employment
decision impacts only one employee, and thus only one gender.
Admittedly, it might be that the employer acted for reasons wholly
unmotivated by gender, or it might be that gender played a
198
motivating role. The key distinction is that it is impossible to
determine whether gender motivated an employment decision arising
due to jealousy without looking into the circumstances.
B. Reconsidering the Limits of Romantic-Relationship Precedents
Courts have consistently refused to recognize sex-discrimination
claims when there is a consensual sexual or romantic relationship

196. See supra Part III.B–C. Admittedly, the significance of this distinction in mixed-motive
analysis is unclear. The lack of clarity stems from the fact that although 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m)
clearly provides that unlawful discrimination occurs when gender is a motivating factor in an
employment decision, it does not specify whose gender may not be considered. Consequently,
§ 2000e-2(m) may be interpreted to forbid any employment decision motivated by gender,
including an employment decision motivated by the gender of a person other than the adversely
impacted employee. Phillips, supra note 195, at 569 & n.110. But § 2000e-2(m) may also be
interpreted to provide that an employment decision constitutes unlawful discrimination only if
the gender of the adversely impacted employee motivated the employer. Phillips, supra note
197, at 570–71; Poole, supra note 29, at 849. Because the introductory clause of § 2000e-2(m)
contains the qualifier “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this subchapter,” it is arguably
significant for purposes of interpreting § 2000e-2(m) that § 2000e-2(a) prohibits employment
discrimination against any individual “because of such individual’s” protected characteristic.
Phillips, supra note 197, at 570–71; Poole, supra note 29, at 849.
197. U.S. EEOC, NOTICE NO. 915.048, POLICY GUIDANCE ON EMPLOYER LIABILITY
UNDER TITLE VII FOR SEXUAL FAVORITISM (1990), available at http://www.eeoc.gov/
policy/docs/sexualfavor.html (citing Benzies v. Ill. Dep’t of Mental Health, 810 F.2d 146, 148
(7th Cir. 1987); Bellissimo v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 764 F.2d 175, 180 (3d Cir. 1985)).
198. See supra Part III.B.
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199

But in cases involving
between employer and employee.
terminations resulting from romantic jealousy, courts have extended
the general rule that claims arising in the context of romantic
relationships are not actionable under Title VII to claims arising
200
outside the context of such relationships. This Subsection considers
whether the rationales for the romantic-relationship rule justify
courts’ extension of the rule to dismiss discrimination claims based
either on sexually suggestive employee conduct or the existence of
nonromantic personal relationships between employers and
employees.
The primary rationale underlying the rule that Title VII does not
apply to claims stemming from romantic relationships is that Title VII
prohibits making employment decisions “based on a person’s sex, not
201
his or her sexual affiliations.” Notably, the distinction between sex
and sexual affiliations arose in the sexual-favoritism context before
202
Congress amended Title VII to endorse mixed-motive analysis. In
fact, the Supreme Court had previously interpreted the history and
language of Title VII to be concerned primarily with differential
203
treatment based solely on protected characteristics.
Today,
however, relying on sex as a motivating factor in an employment
decision constitutes unlawful discrimination even when other
204
legitimate factors also motivate the decision. It is arguably unclear
whether the distinction between sex and sexual affiliations remains a
defensible basis for rejecting discrimination claims arising in the
context of romantic relationships without individualized inquiry into
205
whether gender actually motivated a particular termination.
199. See supra notes 81, 85 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Part II.B.
201. DeCintio v. Westchester Cnty. Med. Ctr., 807 F.2d 304, 306–07 (2d Cir. 1986); see also
supra Part II.B.
202. See DeCintio, 807 F.2d at 306–08 (drawing this distinction in the context of an
employment decision intended to favor a paramour (citing Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson,
477 U.S. 57, 64 (1986); L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13
(1978))); see also supra notes 33–37, 52–54 and accompanying text.
203. Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) (“The emphasis of both
the language and the legislative history of the statute is on eliminating discrimination in
employment; similarly situated employees are not to be treated differently solely because they
differ with respect to race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.”).
204. See supra note 52 and accompanying text.
205. For example, one might argue that distinctions based on sexual affiliation cannot justify
dismissal of claims arising in the context of employer–employee romantic relationships because
gender is a motivating factor in romantic relationships and in any termination stemming from
such relationships. But this argument is susceptible to the same deficits as the argument that
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In any event, the distinction between sex and sexual affiliations
provides only a limited basis for extending the romantic-relationship
rule beyond the context of romantic relationships. Sexually suggestive
employee conduct does not necessarily indicate that a romantic
relationship exists. Much like an employee engaged in a romantic
206
however, an employee who
relationship with her employer,
knowingly engages in sexually suggestive conduct at work injects a
sexual component into the workplace. Unquestionably, an employer’s
discouraging sexual conduct in the workplace is not problematic
207
under Title VII. Most employers generally discourage such conduct,
and most employees reasonably anticipate that such conduct could
end their employment. Moreover, courts are accustomed to
distinguishing between sexual and nonsexual conduct in various legal
contexts.
In contrast, extending the romantic-relationship rule to dismiss
claims arising in the context of personal relationships not involving
208
employee sexual conduct is far less defensible. The recognized
209
distinction between sex and sexual affiliations does not justify
extending the rule in this context because personal relationships are
not necessarily sexual or romantic. Unlike an employee who engages
in sexually suggestive conduct at work or has a romantic relationship
with her employer, an employee who has a platonic friendship with

romantic jealousy is inherently based on gender. See supra Part III.A. An alternate argument
comes into focus when the sexual-affiliation distinction is relied upon to dismiss claims arising
from terminations based on sexual orientation. See, e.g., Simonton v. Runyon, 232 F.3d 33, 36
(2d Cir. 2000) (“Because the term ‘sex’ in Title VII refers only to membership in a class
delineated by gender, and not to sexual affiliation, Title VII does not proscribe discrimination
because of sexual orientation.”). Arguably, the sexual-affiliation distinction does not justify
dismissal in this context because terminations based on sexual orientation may be impermissibly
motivated by sex stereotypes. The EEOC and an increasing number of courts have endorsed
this position. Brief of the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amicus Curiae
in Support of Rehearing at 3, Muhammad v. Caterpillar, Inc., 767 F.3d 694 (7th Cir. 2014) (No.
12–1723), 2014 WL 5323209, at *1. The validity and scope of the sexual-affiliation distinction are
beyond the scope of this Note.
206. See Sharon Rabin-Margalioth, Love at Work, 13 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 237, 246
& n.74 (2006) (distinguishing between romantic relationships that include a sexual component
and other workplace relationships, including those that may involve psychological intimacy).
207. See, e.g., Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 745 (1998) (establishing an
affirmative defense from vicarious liability in harassment claims when an “employer exercised
reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually harassing behavior, and . . . the
plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective
opportunities provided by the employer”).
208. See supra notes 134–36 and accompanying text.
209. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
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her employer does not introduce a sexual component into the
workplace.
Importantly, personal relationships are commonplace in the
210
workplace, and the workplace environment is inherently conducive
211
to their formation. Indeed, social science suggests that personal
relationships are bound to form in the workplace—and that such
relationships overwhelmingly benefit both employers and
212
employees.
Over time, most workplace relationships tend to
develop qualities similar to those involved in intimate personal
213
relationships.
Distinguishing between ordinary workplace
relationships and personal relationships is not only unfamiliar
territory for courts, but also profoundly problematic because the line
214
between the two types of relationships is uncertain at best.
That employment decisions motivated by feelings are generally
215
not prohibited by Title VII does not justify extension of the
romantic-relationship rule to personal relationships. The romanticrelationship rule essentially operates as a presumption that
employment decisions stem from personal feelings whenever a
216
romantic relationship exists between an employer and an employee.
210. See, e.g., Stephen R. Marks, Intimacy in the Public Realm: The Case of Co-workers, 72
SOC. FORCES 843, 850 (1994) (concluding based on empirical research that half of American
workers form “close friendships” and discuss “important matters” with coworkers); see also
Cynthia L. Estlund, Working Together: The Workplace, Civil Society, and the Law, 89 GEO. L.J.
1, 9 (2000) (“For those who work full-time, most discussions of current issues and events,
movies, sports, popular culture, and personal relationships outside the family are with
coworkers.”).
211. See Estlund, supra note 210, at 12 (noting that the social environment of the workplace
itself “engenders personal feelings of affection, sympathy, empathy, and friendship among
coworkers”); Rabin-Margalioth, supra note 206, at 246 n.74 (“The workplace is a stage to form
other types of personal relationships such as strong friendships or mentorships.”).
212. Laura A. Rosenbury, Working Relationships, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 117, 130
(2011).
213. See, e.g., Estlund, supra note 210, at 9 (“Through . . . repeated and frequent
interactions, coworkers often learn about each others’ lives and develop feelings of affection,
mutual understanding, empathy, and loyalty.”).
214. See id. at 12 (“Relationships that form in the workplace often spill beyond it, and make
up much of our social circles.” (citing ARLIE RUSSELL HOCHSCHILD, THE TIME BIND: WHEN
WORK BECOMES HOME AND HOME BECOMES WORK 35–52 (1997))); Rosenbury, supra note
212, at 119 (noting that workplace relationships that “are at times primarily transactional” may
“at other times . . . take on intimate qualities similar to those of family relationships or
friendships”).
215. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
216. See id. Some commentators argue that courts deciding Title VII claims have generally
“begun to presume that personal animosity most likely motivated the employer.” Chad Derum
& Karen Engle, The Rise of the Personal Animosity Presumption in Title VII and the Return to
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But applying the same presumption whenever a personal relationship
exists between an employer and an employee is problematic.
Significantly, the presence of the triggering condition for the
presumption—the existence of a personal relationship rather than an
ordinary workplace relationship—would be difficult to discern
reliably. More fundamentally, social science suggests that personal
217
relationships in the workplace are enormously common.
Consequently, a general rule that employment decisions based on
personal relationships do not constitute sex discrimination runs the
risk of eviscerating the protections afforded by Title VII.
Limiting the personal relationships that can trigger dismissal of
sex-discrimination claims to those that are consensual cannot cure the
significant problems with extending the romantic-relationship rule to
the personal-relationship context. As the concurring justices in
Nelson recognized, “subtle issues of power and control . . . make the
line between consensual and submissive relationships difficult to
218
draw.” In some cases, that line might be drawn in the wrong place,
meaning that an employer’s unreciprocated and unwelcome conduct
toward an employee could ultimately result in the dismissal of her
claim. In addition, an employer’s unreciprocated and unwelcome
conduct could easily be interpreted to support the conclusion that an
employer–employee relationship was personal and consensual. For
example, the concurring justices in Nelson reasoned that the sexually
suggestive comments by Dr. Knight—comments they acknowledged
“would commonly be viewed as inappropriate” and “beyond the
reasonable parameters of workplace interaction”—supported the
conclusion that he and Nelson had a consensual personal
219
relationship. Yet as the majority opinion acknowledged, the same
comments could have supported a claim for sexual harassment
220
Importantly, both forms of sexual harassment
against him.
recognized under Title VII typically involve sexually suggestive

‘No Cause’ Employment, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1177, 1179 (2003). Note that the facts of Nelson do
not suggest that Dr. Knight felt personal animosity toward Nelson. Nelson v. James H. Knight
DDS, P.C., 834 N.W.2d 64, 66 (Iowa 2013).
217. See supra notes 210–13 and accompanying text.
218. Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 80 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (citing Billie Wright
Dziech, Robert W. Dziech II & Donald B. Hordes, ‘Consensual’ or Submissive Relationships:
The Second-Best Kept Secret, 6 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL’Y 83 (1999)).
219. Id. at 78, 79–80.
220. Id. at 72 n.7 (majority opinion).
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221

conduct. Of course, suggestive conduct that is competent to support
a harassment claim is not necessarily pervasive or severe enough,
222
standing alone, to prove actionable harassment. But any rule that
allows an employer’s unreciprocated sexually suggestive conduct to
trigger dismissal of an employee’s sex-discrimination claim on
summary judgment is flatly inconsistent with the spirit and purpose of
Title VII and other antidiscrimination laws.
Critically, from the fact than an employee did not tell her
223
employer she was offended by his behavior or the fact that she did
224
not file a sexual-harassment claim, it does not follow that the
employer’s conduct was welcome. There are many reasons why an
employee enduring unwelcome sexual conduct at the hands of her
employer might choose not to complain or decide not to file a sexual225
harassment claim. Her employer’s conduct might be offensive, but
226
not severe or pervasive enough to prove a sexual-harassment claim.
Her wisest course of action might be to quietly seek other
employment, particularly if she lives in a rural town with a limited job

221. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65–67 (1986) (describing sexual
harassment prohibited by Title VII); see also Tenge v. Phillips Modern Ag Co., 446 F.3d 903,
908 (8th Cir. 2006) (“Title VII now prohibits both quid pro quo harassment, where an
employee’s submission to or rejection of a supervisor’s unwelcome sexual advances is used as
the basis for employment decisions, and hostile work environment harassment, where ‘the
workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule, and insult that is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive
working environment.’” (quoting Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993))).
222. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21 (concluding that to establish a hostile work environment, the
conduct must be “sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of . . . employment and
create an abusive working environment” (quoting Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67) (quotation marks
omitted)).
223. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 66 (“Nelson does not remember ever telling Dr. Knight . . .
that she was offended.”).
224. See id. at 65, 72 n.7 (pointing out that Nelson “did not bring a sexual harassment or
hostile work environment claim”). Although Nelson did not initially file a sexual-harassment
claim, she did later argue that her petition was broad enough to support a sexual-harassment
claim. See Second Petition for Rehearing at 4, Nelson, 834 N.W.2d 64 (No. 11–1857).
225. See, e.g., Jo Annette Jacobs, Note, No More Nervous Breakdowns: Sexual Harassment
and the Hostile Work Environment, 62 UMKC L. REV. 521, 523–25 (describing considerations
employees may weigh in choosing how to respond to sexual harassment); Martha S. West,
Preventing Sexual Harassment: The Federal Courts’ Wake-Up Call for Women, 68 BROOK. L.
REV. 457, 467–68 (2002) (describing “well-documented reasons why women often fail to
complain about workplace harassment”).
226. See supra note 222 and accompanying text.
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227

market or works in a specialized field with limited employment
opportunities. Alternatively, because she reasonably believes that she
lacks any viable employment alternative, she might try to defuse the
228
situation through avoidance. In short, employees often avoid
directly confronting employers who engage in unwelcome sexual
229
conduct, and they often do so for logical and understandable
reasons.
As the preceding analysis suggests, even a rule that permits only
consensual personal relationships between employers and employees
to trigger the dismissal of sex-discrimination claims sweeps far too
broadly. Such a rule would operate to protect employers from liability
for sex discrimination in circumstances arising through no fault of
employees. Indeed, such a rule could operate to protect an employer
who engages in sexually suggestive behavior toward an employee
because he finds her to be sexually desirable.
CONCLUSION
Judicial hesitation to recognize romantic-jealousy claims likely
stems at least in part from apprehension about opening the floodgates
230
to such claims. But any fear that recognizing romantic-jealousy
claims will lead to widespread, devastating judgments against
employers is misplaced. Jealousy is rarely discussed in discrimination
cases, which suggests that employers rarely cite jealousy as the basis

227. The 2010 census reported the population of the town where Dr. Knight’s dental office
is located as 25,206. State & County QuickFacts: Fort Dodge (City), Iowa, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU
(July 8, 2014, 6:44 PM), http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/19/1928515.html.
228. See Jacobs, supra note 225, at 524 (observing that the most common response to sexual
harassment “is to avoid or ignore it in hopes that it will go away” or to “seek to defuse the
situation by joking, stalling, or negotiating”).
229. Id. (“Very few women use direct confrontation, such as telling the harasser to stop or
pursuing a formal complaint.”).
230. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 70 (“Nelson’s viewpoint would allow any termination
decision related to a consensual relationship to be challenged as a discriminatory action because
the employee could argue the relationship would not have existed but for her or his gender.”).
Judicial hesitation to recognize romantic-jealousy claims might also stem in part from the
tension between antidiscrimination laws and the employment-at-will doctrine or the desire to
safeguard the institution of marriage. See id. at 75 (Cady, C.J., concurring specially) (“Thus,
while the loss of a job is often devastating to an employee, and at times unfair, these
considerations do not play a role under our employment-at-will doctrine, and our exceptions to
this law, such as sex discrimination, are only based on the underlying discriminatory motivation
of the decision maker.” (citing Jasper v. H. Nizam, Inc., 764 N.W.2d 751, 762 (Iowa 2009))); id.
at 67–71 (majority opinion) (emphasizing that Nelson was perceived to be a “threat” to the
Knights’ marriage).

ROGERS IN PP (DO NOT DELETE)

1496

3/24/2015 11:44 AM

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 64:1453

for their employment decisions. It is safe to assume that this trend
would remain unchanged if employers learned that they could face
231
potential liability for jealousy-based employment decisions.
Furthermore, employee victories would be primarily symbolic in
cases in which the liable employer proved that he would have made
the same decision even if he had not been motivated by gender.
These symbolic victories would offer psychological, if not financial,
recompense to victims of discrimination. They would also perform a
meaningful expressive function by reinforcing the fundamental values
underlying antidiscrimination laws.
Whatever the potential costs of acknowledging the viability of
romantic-jealousy claims, they do not outweigh the potential costs of
continued refusal to recognize theoretically viable sex-discrimination
claims. The suggestion that romantic jealousy generally constitutes a
lawful basis for employment decisions creates a perverse incentive for
employers to falsely cite jealousy as the motivation for their
employment decisions. In theory, jealousy could come to operate as a
de facto defense to sex-discrimination claims—a defense that would
be alarmingly simple to invoke. Admittedly, courts could develop
standards to limit the operation of jealousy as a defense to sexdiscrimination claims to circumstances in which jealousy was justified
or reasonable. But this approach to solving the “de facto defense”
problem is hardly preferable to avoiding the problem altogether
through careful application of mixed-motive analysis to romanticjealousy claims.
To be sure, we might be sympathetic to individuals experiencing
romantic jealousy. Jealousy is unpleasant, and some jealous persons
are justified in fearing that a relationship is in jeopardy. But jealousy
can be a destructive force causing harm that extends beyond the
232
person experiencing it. Moreover, it is not difficult to imagine

231. Even if this assessment is incorrect, courts should arguably refrain from considering the
possibility of increased judicial workload when shaping the substantive law. See generally Marin
K. Levy, Judging the Flood of Litigation, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007 (2013) (arguing in favor of a
presumption against floodgates arguments).
232. Tucker, supra note 143, at 224–27. It is well documented, for example, that romantic
jealousy often motivates homicide and abuse. See id. at 225–26 (summarizing research
concerning the connection between romantic jealousy and incidents of homicide and abuse).
Even if society chooses to accept a conception of romantic jealousy “as both innate and
inextricable from love,” it must not be deluded into viewing jealousy as benign. Id. at 222, 224–
31 (concluding that “jealousy is far from benign, and as a culture we should therefore be
interested in minimizing, rather than encouraging, its effects”).
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jealousy arising based on the perception of a threat that is entirely
imagined.
Antidiscrimination laws do not protect employees against
233
general unfairness, but courts must be mindful of the underlying
purposes of those laws in determining the scope of their protections.
Sex-discrimination claims that arise because an employer terminated
an employee due to romantic jealousy call for thorough analysis of
the underlying circumstances to determine the motivations that gave
rise to jealousy. To accurately determine whether a jealousy-based
termination was simply unfair or whether it constituted unlawful
discrimination, courts must look behind the jealousy.

233. See Nelson, 834 N.W.2d at 69 (“Title VII and the Iowa Civil Rights Act are not general
fairness laws, and an employer does not violate them by treating an employee unfairly so long as
the employer does not engage in discrimination based upon the employee’s protected status.”).

